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THE FREE JAMMIE MOVEMENT: IS MAKING A
FILE AVAILABLE TO OTHER USERS OVER A
PEER-TO-PEER COMPUTER NETWORK
SUFFICIENT TO INFRINGE THE COPYRIGHT
OWNER'S 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) DISTRIBUTION
RIGHT?
Ken Nicholds*
Of the thousands of lawsuits brought by the Recording Industry
Association of America against individuals for sharing music files over the
Internet, the case of Jammie Thomas-Rasset was the first to complete a full
jury trial. The judge vacated the initial judgment against Thomas-Rasset
because he found, sua sponte, that he was mistaken when he instructed the
jury that making a file available over a computer network for others to
download is sufficient to find infringement of the exclusive distribution right
of the copyright owner under 17 U.S.C. § 106(3). This Note argues that
there is no making-available right, but that making-available may be
considered as circumstantial evidence of distribution.
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INTRODUCTION: ON THE INTERNET, THE CULTURE Is FREE
The internet is a copy machine.... The digital economy is thus run on
a river of copies. Unlike the mass-produced reproductions of the machine
age, these copies are not just cheap, they are free. I
The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), 2 representing
the major music record labels, knows this all too well. Napster brought the
transfer of files over a computer network between individuals (filesharing)
1. Kevin Kelly, Better Than Free, EDGE, Feb. 5, 2008,
http://www.edge.org/3rd-culture/kelly08/kelly08_index.html.
2. See Recording Industry Association of America-Who We Are,
http://riaa.org/aboutus.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("The Recording Industry Association
of America (RIAA) is the trade group that represents the U.S. recording industry. Its
mission is to foster a business and legal climate that supports and promotes our members'
creative and financial vitality. Its members are the record companies that comprise the most
vibrant national music industry in the world. RIAA members create, manufacture and/or
distribute approximately 85% of all legitimate sound recordings produced and sold in the
United States.").
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to the mainstream in 1999, 3 and the music industry took note. As
technology advances and becomes cheaper, the Motion Picture Association
of America (MPAA),4 representing the major movie studios, also fears for
the survival of its industry. In contrast, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF), 5 declaring that it "champion[s] the public interest in every critical
battle affecting digital rights," 6 fears for the survival of "free speech,
privacy, innovation, and consumer rights today."'7
In the middle of this tussle, in Duluth, Minnesota, is Jammie Thomas-
Rasset, a single mother with limited funds who claims that she did not
distribute music files over the Intemet.8 A jury found her liable for
copyright infringement, but the judge vacated the judgment.9 He explained
that he erred when he instructed the jury that making a music file available
over a computer network for others to download is sufficient to find
copyright infringement.' 0 Within the context of the Thomas case, this Note
addresses whether making a file available to other users over a peer-to-peer
computer network is sufficient to infringe the copyright owner's 17 U.S.C.
§ 106(3) distribution right. In other words, this Note analyzes whether an
owner's exclusive distribution right extends to making the copyrighted
work available to others, i.e., whether there is a making-available right.
There has been extensive online criticism of the making-available right.1'
This is at least in part due to the culture of the Internet. The Internet was
built with a culture that encourages sharing for free. Today, even traditional
3. See Spencer E. Ante, Inside Napster, BUSINESSWEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at 112.
4. See Motion Picture Association of America, About Us,
http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUs.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("The Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA) and its international counterpart, the Motion Picture
Association (MPA) serve as the voice and advocate of the American motion picture, home
video and television industries, domestically through the MPAA and internationally through
the MPA. Today, these associations represent not only the world of theatrical film, but serve
as leader and advocate for major producers and distributors of entertainment programming
for television, cable, home video and future delivery systems not yet imagined.").
5. See About EFF, Electronic Frontier Foundation, http://www.eff.org/about (last
visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("When our freedoms in the networked world come under attack, the
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is the first line of defense. EFF broke new ground
when it was founded in 1990-well before the Internet was on most people's radar-and
continues to confront cutting-edge issues defending free speech, privacy, innovation, and
consumer rights today. From the beginning, EFF has championed the public interest in
every critical battle affecting digital rights. Blending the expertise of lawyers, policy
analysts, activists, and technologists, EFF achieves significant victories on behalf of
consumers and the general public. EFF fights for freedom primarily in the courts, bringing
and defending lawsuits even when that means taking on the US government or large
corporations.").
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Eric Bangeman, Thomas Verdict Overturned, Making Available Theory
Rejected, ARs TECHNICA, Sept. 24, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080924-
thomas-verdict-overturned-making-available-theory-rejected.html ("[T]he ruling was
another crushing blow to the RIAA's pet legal theory .... ").
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media are sharing: The New York Times can be read in its entirety, often
even earlier than print newspapers are delivered, at no cost.12 Hulu.com
shows movies and television shows on user demand in their entirety. 13 The
Firefox web browser uses open source code in its software to allow other
developers to build useful, free "add-on" applications such as customizable
weather forecasts. 14  Craigslist.org has single-handedly revolutionized
classified advertising in the United States by making it free and faster than
print newspaper classified advertisements. 15  Wikipedia.org is a free
encyclopedia that contains more encyclopedia entries than a print edition
could ever contain, and is updated on an ongoing basis to keep up-to-date.] 6
In line with this powerful "free" culture, Thomas-Rasset has sold "Free
Jammie. Free Everyone" goods online to support her cause. 17 This culture
will play a significant role in shaping legislation and, to some extent, court
decisions that address this issue.
There is great uncertainty as to what sharing of digital music content is
permissible. For example, as a friendly gesture to share American culture
with others, President Barack Obama gave the Queen of England an iPod
with forty songs by American artists. 18 It was a simple act with no simple
answer to the most basic question: did the President break the law? 19
Similarly, there is no simple answer as to whether there is a making-
available right. This Note argues that there is no making-available right,
but that making-available may be considered as circumstantial evidence of
distribution. Part I introduces the origins of the making-available right.
Part L.A provides an overview of the phenomenon of music filesharing,
starting with Napster, and discusses the technical underpinnings of the
filesharing network as applied to legal determinations. Part L.A then
presents the industry's claim that filesharing has negatively impacted the
music industry. Part I.A.2 describes the immense scope of the RIAA's
litigation campaign in response to filesharing. Part I.B then outlines the
alleged making-available right, explaining why it arose, its Copyright Act
of 1976 (Act) underpinnings, and international treaty support for the right.
Finally, Part I.B.4 introduces the highest profile case to consider the
making-available right, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas.20
Part II examines the arguments that have been made both for and against
a making-available right, and the proposed alternatives to a making-
12. See The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
13. See Hulu, http://www.hulu.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
14. See Add-ons for Firefox, https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox (last visited Oct.
19, 2009).
15. See Craigslist, http://craigslist.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
16. See Wikipedia, http://wikipedia.org (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
17. See infra note 118 and accompanying text.
18. Posting of Fred von Lohmann to Electronic Frontier Foundation Deep Links Blog,
http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/04/first-sale-president-obama-and-queen-england (Apr. 2,
2009).
19. See id.
20. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
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available right. Part II.A first looks to the statutory text of the Act. Part
II.B follows with an examination of case law, starting with the key
appellate decisions and following with district court decisions that have
interpreted those key cases. Part II.C examines U.S. obligations under the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) treaties. Finally, Part
II.D presents alternatives to a making-available right, including
accommodations under domestic law, approaches in international case law,
international legislation both pending and enacted, and proposed industry
solutions in the United States.
Part III adopts the view of the Thomas decision that until the U.S.
Congress or Supreme Court intervenes, there is no making-available right,
but that making-available may be considered as circumstantial evidence of
unauthorized distribution.
I. ORIGINS OF THE MAKING-AVAILABLE RIGHT
Part I introduces filesharing and the music industry's lawsuits in
response, with particular focus on the Thomas case and the legal
underpinnings of the RIAA's claim of a making-available right. Part L.A
introduces the phenomenon of filesharing and its impact on the music
industry and outlines the massive scale of the RIAA's litigation campaign.
Part I.B presents the making-available right, relevant sections of the Act,
applicable sections of WIPO treaties, and the Thomas case.
A. Filesharing and the Music Industry
Technology has made distribution and reproduction of music nearly cost-
free and pervasive. Reproduction and distribution not authorized by the
copyright owner is, with limited exceptions, illegal under the Act. 2 1 Part
I.A. 1 examines the phenomenon of sharing music files over the Internet and
its alleged impact on the music industry. Part I.A.2 then discusses the
industry's initiation of mass lawsuits in response to this technological
disruption to their business model.
1. Napster and Its Aftermath
Napster brought peer-to-peer filesharing computer networks (P2P) to the
mainstream in 1999.22 P2P is so named because it enables users' computers
to communicate directly with one another rather than through a central
server, meaning that one "peer" computer communicates directly with
another "peer."2 3 File transfer is generally much faster on P2P than other
networks because the communication is not routed through a central server,
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. See supra note 3.
23. See MGM v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 919-20 (2005). Peer-to-peer (P2P) technology
has become incredibly popular because extensive storage space and connectivity bandwidth
for a central server are not required. See id at 920.
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and because many copies of a file are often available on different user
computers.24  Importantly for the RIAA, users remain anonymous,25
publicly revealing only an Internet Protocol (IP) address, which is a
numerical address on the network for that user's computer, and a
username.26
Filesharing has become incredibly popular. The Pirate Bay, a filesharing
website, has been listed among the top 100 most visited sites on the
Internet. 27  Filesharing has also enabled unprecedented sharing of
copyrighted materials, and of music in particular. The International
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) estimates that the ratio of
unauthorized to authorized music downloads is more than 40:1.28 Although
iTunes,29 the leading authorized online distributor, has now sold over six
billion songs,30 some Internet service providers (ISPs) estimate that four
billion songs are shared each month via filesharing, which is a ratio closer
to 150:1.31 Given that until recently approximately 3% of the songs on an
average person's iPod music player were downloaded from iTunes, which
protected against copying, 32 up to 97% of the music that people were
listening to on iPod music players could have been shared or acquired via
filesharing. Now iTunes sells music without protection against copying,
meaning that all music from iTunes can be shared with others via
24. See id. at 920.
25. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 159 (D. Mass. 2008).
26. See id. at 160.
27. See Posting of Ernesto to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/the-pirate-bay-100-
popular-080518 (May 18, 2008).
28. See Richard Wachman, Pirates Still Have All the Best Tunes, OBSERVER (London),
May 27, 2007, Business at 4.
29. See What Is iTunes?, http://www.apple.com/itunes/what-is (last visited Oct. 19,
2009).
30. Posting of Erick Schonfeld to TechCrunch, http://www.techcrunch.com/2009/01/06/
itunes-sells-6-billion-songs-and-other-fun-stats-from-the-philnote (Jan. 6, 2009).
31. See Andrew Orlowski, For Every DRM Download, 16 P2P Swaps, REG., June 23,
2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/06/23/guardian-bogus_p2p. Another study
estimated that one billion music files are shared every day. JOHN F. GANTZ ET AL., THE
EXPANDING DIGITAL UNIVERSE 1 (2007) (citing JOHN GANTZ & JACK B. ROCHESTER, PIRATES
OF THE DIGITAL MILLENIUM 175 (2005)).
32. See Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, (Feb. 6, 2007),
http://www.apple.com/hotnews/thoughtsonmusic. An iPod is a portable music player that
plays music and video files. See iPod Classic Product Introduction,
http://www.apple.com/ipodclassic (last visited Oct. 19, 2009); see also iTunes Software
License Agreement (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://images.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/
itunes.pdf ("IMPORTANT NOTE: This software may be used to reproduce materials. It is
licensed to you only for reproduction of non-copyrighted materials, materials in which you
own the copyright, or materials you are authorized or legally permitted to reproduce. This
software may also be used for remote access to music files for listening between computers.
Remote access of copyrighted music is only provided for lawful personal use or as otherwise
legally permitted. If you are uncertain about your right to copy or permit access to any
material you should contact your legal advisor.").
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filesharing. 33  A British study demonstrates the scope of filesharing
amongst young people: 96% of eighteen- to twenty-four-year-olds copy
music illegally, and approximately half of the music on an average
teenager's iPod is illegal. 34 Overall, one research organization estimates
that 10% of downloads are legal.35 Another British study found that the
primary source of these illegally copied files is via filesharing: 63% of
young people who download music illegally download from filesharing
networks. 36
The RIAA claims that filesharing has decimated the music industry.37
While the cause of the decline is debatable, 38 compact disc (CD) sales in
the United States have been in sharp decline since 2000, with CD album
sales down 46% by the end of 2007, and CD singles sales almost
nonexistent after declining 92%.39 It is important to remember that this is
the decline of a single format, however. Legal digital music downloads
grew over 28% from 2007 to 2008 to top one billion songs sold.40 Earlier,
cassette sales showed growth as vinyl sales declined, and CD sales grew
while cassette sales declined.41  Still, looking at all formats (including
digital, vinyl, and others), the dollar value of music sales declined 28%
33. Apple has recently entered into an agreement with record companies to eliminate
digital rights management (DRM), and therefore has eliminated the technical block to
copying music files bought via iTunes. See Posting of Schonfeld, supra note 30.
34. See Dan Sabbagh, Average Teenager's iPod Has 800 Illegal Music Tracks, TIMES
(London), June 16, 2008, at 13.
35. See Press Release, The NPD Group, Consumers Acquired More Music in 2007, but
Spent Less (Feb. 26, 2008), http://www.npd.com/press/releases/press_080226a.html.
36. THE UNIV. OF HERTFORDSHIRE & BRITISH Music RIGHTS, 2008 SURVEY INTO THE
Music EXPERIENCE AND BEHAVIOUR IN YOUNG PEOPLE 11 (2008).
37. See RIAA-Piracy: Online and on the Street, http://riaa.org/physicalpiracy.php (last
visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("Across the board, this theft has hurt the music community, with
thousands of layoffs, songwriters out of work and new artists having a harder time getting
signed and breaking into the business.").
38. See, e.g., BIRGITTE ANDERSEN & MARION FRENZ, THE IMPACT OF Music DOWNLOADS
AND P2P FILE-SHARING ON THE PURCHASE OF Music: A STUDY FOR INDUSTRY CANADA 3
(2007), http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ippd-dppi.nsf/eng/ip01457.html ("Our review of existing
econometric studies suggests that P2P file-sharing tends to decrease music purchasing.
However, we find the opposite, namely that P2P file-sharing tends to increase rather than
decrease music purchasing."); Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 115 U. CHI. J. POL. ECON. 1, 1-2 (2007)
("Downloads have an effect on sales that is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Our
estimates are inconsistent with claims that file sharing is the primary reason for the decline
in music sales during our study period.").
39. See RIAA, 2007 YEAR-END SHIPMENT STATISTICS 1 (2007) (explaining that CD
album shipments in 2000 were 942,500,000, and in 2007 were 511,100,000, while CD
singles shipments in 2000 were 34,200,000, and in 2007 were 2,600,000).
40. See Ayala Ben-Yehuda, Digital Downloads Break a Billion in 2008, BLLBOARD.BIZ,
Dec. 18, 2008, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content display/industry/
e3i260af0867f21cdd3cbf806fcf4334326 ("Through Dec. 14 [2008], 1,001,000,000 digital
tracks were sold in the United States.").
41. See Posting of C.A. Joyce to Swivel, http://www.swivel.com/graphs/show/4146447
(Dec. 28, 2006) (graphing the United States music sales on vinyl, cassette, and CD from
1975-2005).
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between 2000 and 2007.42 Music sales in 2008 continue this trend of
decreasing revenues, where increasing sales of digital singles (single songs
rather than albums) were insufficient to make up for the significant decline
in CD sales. 4
3
2. RIAA Lawsuits
In the face of declining sales, the RIAA sued. They sued a digital music
player manufacturer 44 and filesharing software providers (Napster,45
Aimster,46 Grokster and KaZaa, 47 and LimeWire 48). MGM v. Grokster,
Ltd.49 reached the Supreme Court, which found that the "probable scope of
copyright infringement is staggering."'50  The Court introduced intent
("inducement") as an element of vicarious copyright infringement. 51 In
Grokster, the Court said that "MGM's evidence gives reason to think that
the vast majority of users' downloads are acts of infringement." 52 The
RIAA was jubilant with its victory and said that it was the "dawn of a new
day." 53
The RIAA also sued over 18,000 individuals who used filesharing
networks. 54 Many saw this as a desperate move and a public relations
42. See RIAA, supra note 39 (explaining that the total dollar value of music sales in
2000 was $14,323,700,000, and in 2007 was $10,370,000,000).
43. See Coolfer: Music and the Industry, http://www.coolfer.com/blog/archives/
2009/01/2008_the result.php (Jan. 2, 2009, 06:32 EST) (explaining that 2008's "track
equivalent albums," where an "equivalent album" consists of ten digital tracks, numbered
only 107,000,000 in comparison to 362,000,000 CDs sold in 2008 and that although digital
track sales, and therefore number of units sold, had grown, the overall number of albums
sold declined 15% from 2007, meaning that revenues had declined).
44. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072
(9th Cir. 1999).
45. See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
46. See In re Aimster, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
47. See MGM v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
48. See Arista Records LLC v. Lime Group LLC, 532 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
49. 545 U.S. 913.
50. Id. at 923.
51. Id. at 941 ("MGM's evidence in this case most obviously addresses a different basis
of liability for distributing a product open to alternative uses. Here, evidence of the
distributors' words and deeds going beyond distribution as such shows a purpose to cause
and profit from third-party acts of copyright infringement.... There is substantial evidence
in MGM's favor on all elements of inducement .....
52. Id. at 923.
53. RIAA, RIAA Statement on MGM v. Grokster Supreme Court Ruling (June 27,
2005), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.php?id=DE79FC7C-A22E-931E-CF31-59E03950450C
("This decision lays the groundwork for the dawn of a new day-an opportunity that will
bring the entertainment and technology communities even closer together, with music fans
reaping the rewards.").
54. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People... or 35,000?, ARs TECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/has-the-riaa-sued- 18000-people-or-
35000.ars (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (quoting an RIAA spokeswoman confirming that
roughly 18,000 individuals have been sued by the RIAA, but that because suits were first
filed as "John Doe" suits, the same individuals were sued twice, resulting in total lawsuits of
over 30,000); see also Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry To Abandon Mass
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nightmare.55  The lawsuits targeted individuals who had downloaded,
distributed, or made music files available for other users to download via a
filesharing network.56
But these lawsuits did not reverse the decline in music sales or even
decrease the popularity of filesharing. In fact, the publicity generated from
the lawsuits may have actually resulted in increased traffic to the filesharing
sites.57 In one rigorous study done in 2004, the authors concluded that
"P2P traffic has never declined; indeed we have never seen the proportion
of p2p traffic decrease over time (any change is an increase) in any of our
data sources." 58 The chairman of the RIAA, Mitch Bainwol, claims that the
lawsuits have still served an educational purpose: to make it clear to the
public at large that downloading is illegal.59 The EFF concedes that the
lawsuits have increased awareness of illegality, 60 but cites several studies
demonstrating that the majority of individuals still use filesharing networks
even though they believe it is illegal to do so. 6 1 Without regard to the
perception of its legality, one poll found that forty-five percent of
Canadians still regard filesharing as something that should be permitted,62
and another U.K. survey of young people found that almost two-thirds felt
Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2008, at B1 (estimating 35,000 lawsuits); Posting of David
Kravets to Wired, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/09/proving-file-sh.html (Sept. 4,
2008, 14:55 EST) (estimating 30,000 lawsuits); Jon Newton, p2pnet Tanya Andersen v RIAA
Digest, P2PNET, http://www.p2pnet.net/story/16245 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (estimating
40,000 lawsuits).
55. See, e.g., The Lefsetz Letter, http://lefsetz.com/wordpress/index.php/archives/2008/
06/25/enemies-list (June 25, 2008) ("No one who sues his own customers can... [care]
about them.").
56. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (quoting the RIAA's complaint alleging that the defendant used KaZaa (a filesharing
network) to "download the Copyrighted Recordings, to distribute the Copyrighted
Recordings to the public, and/or to make the Copyrighted Recordings available for
distribution to others").
57. See Orlowski, supra note 31 (observing that "file sharing surges after each publicity
blip").
58. THOMAS KARAGIANN1S ET AL., IS P2P DYING OR JUST HIDING? 1 (2004), available at
http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2004/p2p-dying/p2p-dying.pdf, see also ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., R1AA v. THE PEOPLE: FIVE YEARS LATER 9-10 (2008), available at
http://www.eff.org/wp/riaa-v-people-years-later (citing concurring studies by computer
scientists from University of California San Diego and University of California Riverside,
Big Champagne (a provider of filesharing network media measurement), NPD Group (a
marketing research firm), BayTSP (a filesharing network monitor for content owners), and
Pew Internet and American Life Project (a nonprofit research organization)).
59. See McBride & Smith, supra note 54.
60. See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 58, at 11 (citing a 2004 study saying that
88% of children between eight- and eighteen-years-old believed that filesharing
downloading was illegal).
61. See id (citing studies of high school students reporting that eighty-nine percent
downloaded music even though believing it was against the law, and that seventy-two
percent of those who got music online did so through filesharing networks).
62. Antony Bruno, Poll: 45% Say P2P OK, BILLBOARD.BIZ, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/e3iOl058b4cfb43337685fb7e8ca42
dea22.
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as though they should not have to pay for the music that they listen to.63 It
has been reported that the RIAA will not initiate further mass lawsuits
against individuals. 64 Perhaps the RIAA perceived that it had achieved its
educational goal or perhaps it instead conceded the ineffectiveness of the
litigation campaign.
B. The Making-Available Right
Part L.A introduced the phenomenon of filesharing and its impact on the
music industry and outlined the massive scale of the RIAA's litigation
campaign. Part I.B introduces the making-available right, the applicable
laws, and the Thomas case. Part I.B. 1 explains why the RIAA was driven
to claim that there is a making-available right. Part I.B.2 then outlines the
relevant sections and applicable statutory text of the Act that is a part of the
making-available debate. Part I.B.3 introduces the WIPO treaties that are
relevant to the making-available debate. Finally, Part I.B.4 presents the
Thomas case that has been at the center of the making-available debate.
1. RIAA's Evidentiary Problem: Making-Available to the Rescue
The RIAA has generally not been successful in presenting convincing
evidence of distribution. One court even found that "there is almost no
evidence in the case." 65  The RIAA hires investigators 66 to use the
filesharing network to identify the IP addresses of individual users (e.g.,
Phoenyxxx@KaZaA) that make files available through the filesharing
network for the investigators to download. 67 The RIAA then obtains
subpoenas to require the ISPs to disclose the identity of the individuals. 68
In response, defendants have argued that a copyright owner cannot infringe
his own rights.69 According to defendants, because the investigator was
authorized by the RIAA, there was no illegal distribution or copying. 70
Often, however, courts have agreed with the RIAA and found that the
investigating agent was not authorized to infringe and that therefore the
evidence is proof of actual dissemination. 7 1
63. HUMAN CAPITAL, YOUTH AND Music SURVEY 2009, at 6 (2009), available at
http://www.marrakeshrecords.com/Youth%20and%20Music%20Survey%202009%20%28c
%29%20Marrakesh%20Records%20Ltd.pdf.
64. See McBride & Smith, supra note 54.
65. London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 158 (D. Mass. 2008).
66. The RIAA first used MediaSentry as its investigator, but later decided to use another
investigator, DtecNet Software ApS, with some speculating that this was because of several
complaints regarding the privacy of the individuals investigated, and the legality of the
investigative methods used. See Sarah McBride, Changing Tack, RIAA Ditches MediaSentry,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 2009, at B2.
67. See, e.g., London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 157-58.
68. See, e.g., id
69. See, e.g., Defendant's Reply Brief in Support of Her Motion for New Trial at 5,
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497).
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., Interscope Records v. Leadbetter, No. C05-1149-MJP-RSL, 2007 WL
1217705, at *4 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 23, 2007).
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If required to provide proof of dissemination other than to the agent,
however, the RIAA argues that it is impossible for copyright owners to
prove the actual transfer of files on filesharing networks.72 At least one
court agreed.73  Ray Beckerman, a lawyer who frequently represents
defendants in RIAA lawsuits, counters that the RIAA has not tried hard
enough.74 Several organizations such as BigChampagne, NPD, BayTSP,
and the investigator hired in the Thomas case, all claim to possess expertise
in tracking filesharing traffic. 75 However, "fingerprinting" technology to
track copyrighted material, such as Audible Magic,76 is currently imperfect;
for example, one Belgian case found that it was not technically possible for
an ISP to filter its network for music copyright infringement. 77
The RIAA argues that if record companies are required to prove
something that is currently impossible to prove, the copyright owner's
distribution right would be "worthless," which would go against
congressional intent and "common sense. ' 78 Because of this evidentiary
problem, the RIAA includes making-available language in its boilerplate
complaint.79
The RIAA claims that "decades of case law" support a making-available
right.80 The making-available right first appeared in 1997 in Hotaling v.
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.81 A library had made
unauthorized copies of genealogical research materials for other branches,
and the copyright owner had repeatedly requested that the unauthorized
72. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief Pursuant to May 15, 2008 Order at 2, Thomas, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief] ("Copyright
owners typically have no way to monitor-much less prove-the actual transfer of those
files.").
73. London-Sire, 542 F. Supp. 2d at 177 ("[T]ransfers on a peer-to-peer network are not
observable by outside users.").
74. E-mail from Ray Beckerman to author (Oct. 30, 2008, 13:26 EST) (on file with
author).
75. See supra notes 61, 66 and accompanying text.
76. See About Audible Magic, http://www.audiblemagic.comlcompany/about.asp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2009). Another example of a tracking technology is from the Air Force
Institute of Technology. It attempts to track allegedly infringing transfers via a unique code
attributable to that file, but the technology developers admit difficulties in the speed of
analysis, the updating of the database of those codes, and the fact that file sharers would
likely use encryption to hide from the technology. Duncan Graham-Rowe, Sniffing Out Illicit
BitTorrent Files, TECH. REv., Feb. 12, 2009, http://www.technologyreview.com/computing/
22107/page 1.
77. See Chris Williams, Belgian Judge Reverses Moon-on-Stick Music Copyright
Ruling, REG., Oct. 27, 2008, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/27/scarlet-isp_
belgiumreversal.
78. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 2.
79. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 236 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ("Defendant, without the permission or consent of Plaintiffs, has used, and continues
to use, an online media distribution system to download the Copyrighted Recordings, to
distribute the Copyrighted Recordings to the public, and/or to make the Copyrighted
Recordings available for distribution to others." (emphasis added) (quoting Complaint for
Copyright Infringement at 4, Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (No. 05-CV-7340))).
80. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 17.
81. 118 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1997).
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copies be destroyed.82 The court found that a library infringes the copyright
owner's § 106(3) distribution right when it "makes the copy available to the
public." 83 The court seemed motivated by the potential for inequity. If a
library did not keep any records, there would be no proof of distribution,
and therefore the library would not have to pay for the right to distribution
and would then "unjustly profit by its own omission." 84 Similarly, then, the
RIAA argues that individuals should not profit, and copyright owners
should not suffer, because of a lack of evidence of actual distribution.8 5
2. The Copyright Act of 1976
If a making-available right exists as the RIAA argues, it must exist within
the context of the statutory framework of the United States. "The rights
possessed by the owner of a copyright are purely statutory rights." 86 As far
back as 1834, the Supreme Court declared that, with respect to copyright,
Congress created rights rather than sanctioning existing rights.87
Congress's authority to enact copyright legislation comes from the
Constitution. 88  Copyright legislation balances the interests of authors'
control with the free flow of ideas in society. 89 Because of this evolving
balancing act, copyright legislation changes often. 90 In fact, the Act has
been amended over fifty times.91
In Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,92 the Supreme Court
explained that new technology has repeatedly required changes in copyright
82. See id. at 201-02.
83. Id. at 201.
84. Id. at 203 ("Were this not to be considered distribution within the meaning of §
106(3), a copyright holder would be prejudiced by a library that does not keep records of
public use, and the library would unjustly profit by its own omission.").
85. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 2.
86. Miller v. Goody, 125 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
87. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 661-62 (1834) ("Congress, then, by this
[copyright] act, instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it. . . [and
therefore] if the right of the complainants can be sustained, it must be sustained under the
acts of congress.").
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("Congress shall have Power... to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.").
89. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (explaining
that copyright law "involves a difficult balance between the interests of authors and
inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries on the one hand,
and society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and commerce on the
other hand").
90. Id.
91. Brief of Amici Curiae Computer & Communications Industry Association & US
Internet Industry Association in Connection with Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 4, Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
(No. 05-CV-7340) (citing U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR 92: COPYRIGHT LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA iii-viii (2003)).
92. 464 U.S. 417.
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law. 93 For example, prior to the Copyright Act of 1909, making a copy of a
record was not infringement. 94 The making-available debate therefore
properly centers on the meaning of the distribution right, which is defined
in the Act at 17 U.S.C. § 106(3).
Making-available is not an exclusive right explicitly granted to copyright
owners by the Act. 95 There are six exclusive rights explicitly stated: (1)
reproduction; (2) adaptation; (3) distribution; (4) public performance; (5)
public display; and (6) public performance by digital audio transmission.96
An exact copy of the original music file cannot be described as an
adaptation or derivative work.97 In addition, it has been held that digital
downloads are not public performances. 98 The public display right has not
been argued in these cases, even though it may be applicable. 99 Therefore,
the making-available debate centers on the reproduction and distribution
rights.
93. See id at 430 & n. 11 (explaining that legislation has modified copyright law to adapt
to the printing press, player pianos with perforated rolls of music, television, and audio tape
recorder).
94. See Miller v. Goudy, 125 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1954) ("Prior to the
Copyright Act of 1909, the manufacture of phonograph records was not an infringement of
copyright. Thus, before the right to authorize the manufacture of phonograph records was
given protection by statute, a recording of a work could be made without the author's
consent. We must therefore look to the Copyright Act itself to see the extent of the
protection given to the copyright owner." (citing White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo
Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908))).
95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-805 (2006).
96. See id § 106 ("Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following: (1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; (4)
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the
case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission.").
97. See id. § 101 ("A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting
works... [and] recast, transformed, or adapted.").
98. United States v. Am. Soc'y of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 485 F. Supp. 2d
438 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
99. Professor Reese suggests that the drafters of the Act primarily intended for the
display right to apply to transmissions over computer networks. R. Anthony Reese, The
Public Display Right: The Copyright Act's Neglected Solution to the Controversy over RAM
"Copies," 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 83, 83. The EFF raised this argument in its amicus brief in
Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Barker, but the court did not address the argument.
Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 12, Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp.
2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05-CV-7340) [hereinafter EFF Brief 2] ("Fundamental to the
edifice of copyright law has been a distinction between the reproduction and dissemination
of material objects-activities regulated by the reproduction and distribution rights-and the
transmission of works to the public-activity regulated by the rights of the public
performance and display." (citing Reese, supra, at 92-138)).
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The Act states that the distribution right includes "sale," "transfer of
ownership," "rental," "lease," and "lending."' 100  The three major legal
treatises on copyright all agree that infringement of the distribution right
requires an "'actual dissemination."' 10' This suggests that the RIAA needs
to establish that reproduction took place if it is to prove that distribution
occurred. Distribution is not defined in the Act, but it is clear that actual
dissemination is not required to prove that publication has occurred, where
"offering to distribute," or making-available, is sufficient.10 2
The distribution right provides that a copyright owner has the exclusive
right to "distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work."' 0 3 It
is debatable whether filesharing involves "copies," "phonorecords," or
"transfer." It is arguable that a "digital phonorecord delivery" 10 4 is a
"transfer" and therefore distribution under § 115(c)(3)(A). 10 5  Further,
several other references to "phonorecords" and "copies" in the Act imply
that a digitally transmitted file is included in those definitions. 10 6
100. 17 U.S.C. § 106 ("[T]he exclusive rights to do and to authorize.., to distribute
copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending.").
101. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981 (D. Ariz. 2008) (quoting 2
DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.11[A], at 8-149
(2007)); see also id. ("'[An actual transfer must take place; a mere offer for sale will not
infringe the right."' (alteration in original) (quoting 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON
COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1, at 7:125 to 7:126 (3d ed. 2005))); id. ("'Without actual distribution of
copies of the [work], there is no violation of the distribution right."' (quoting 4 WILLIAM F.
PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 13:9, at 13-13 (2007))).
102. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (explaining that publication includes "[t]he offering to distribute
copies or phonorecords to a group of persons for purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display").
103. Id. § 106(3) (emphasis added). "'Copies' are material objects, other than
phonorecords, in which a work is fixed by any method now known or later developed, and
from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id. § 101. "Material object" is not defined
in the Act. "'Phonorecords' are material objects in which sounds, other than those
accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed .. " Id. "A work is
'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord,
by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory
duration." Id.
104. Id. § 115(d) ("A 'digital phonorecord delivery' is each individual delivery of a
phonorecord by digital transmission of a sound recording which results in a specifically
identifiable reproduction by or for any transmission recipient of a phonorecord of that sound
recording ... ").
105. Id. § 115(c)(3)(A) (establishing a compulsory license to "distribute or authorize the
distribution of a phonorecord of a nondramatic musical work by means of a digital
transmission").
106. Section 112 discusses limitations on the exclusive rights where a "transmitting
organization" is permitted to make a copy to make a broadcast so long as it destroys the
original "copy or phonorecord" within six months of the first broadcast. Id. § 112(a)(1).
Where transmitting organizations, such as local television networks, are receiving content
via digital transmission, this language implies that the digital copy that they have made for
themselves is a "copy" or "phonorecord" of the original. Under these "digital phonorecord"
provisions, then, it would appear as though a file that is digitally transmitted via a filesharing
network is a "material object" that is a "copy" or "phonorecord" as defined under § 101, and
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3. WIPO Treaties
The Act may be interpreted in light of international treaties, particularly
the two WIPO treaties that explicitly recognize a making-available right. In
the provision that describes the right of distribution, the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (WCT) states that an author has a making-available right. 10 7
Another WCT provision dealing with "communication to the public" might
be equated with distribution or publication under the Act, and grants a
making-available right. 108  Similarly, the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) describes the distribution right to include a
making-available right. 109
4. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas
Of the thousands of RIAA cases against individuals, Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Thomas"I 0 has received the most publicity and was the first case to
be decided in a full jury trial. 111  At the end of the initial trial, the
Minnesota jury awarded $9250 per song, for a total of $222,000 in statutory
damages, for placing twenty-four songs in a share folder in KaZaa, a
filesharing computer program. 112 This award of $222,000 was to be paid
by Jammie Thomas-Rasset, a single mother of two, 113 making $36,000 a
the transmission carries out a "transfer" as defined under the § 106(3) distribution right. See
infra note 178 and accompanying text.
107. WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 6, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17,
at 7 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 121 (explaining that a copyright owner's rights include "the
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of
their works through sale or other transfer of ownership" (emphasis added)).
108. Id. art. 8 ("[A]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing any communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means,
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of
the public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them."
(emphasis added)).
109. WIPO Performances & Phonograms Treaty art. 12, adopted Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 18 (1997), 2186 U.N.T.S. 203 (explaining that a copyright
owner's rights include "the exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public
of the original and copies of their phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership."
(emphasis added)); see also id art. 8 (explaining that a copyright owner's rights include "the
exclusive right of authorizing the making available to the public of the original and copies of
their performances fixed in phonograms through sale or other transfer of ownership."
(emphasis added)).
110. 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
111. See Special Verdict Form, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497), 2007 WL
3054014; Austin Modine, RIAA Hits Paydirt: Wins First Music-Sharing Jury Trial, REG.,
Oct. 5, 2007, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/10/05/riaawins first music
sharingjury_trial. A second jury trial has now completed, also finding the filesharer liable
for copyright infringement. Jury Verdict Form, Sony BMG Music Entm't v. Tenenbaum,
No. 03-CV-11661 (D. Mass. July 31, 2009) (awarding $22,500 per song, for a total of
$675,000).
112. See Special Verdict Form, supra note 111.
113. See Chris Ayres, Mother Fined $220, 000 in Download Ruling, TIMES (London), Oct.
5, 2007, at 46.
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year, 114 with so few resources that her lawyer made a motion to withdraw
because he was not being paid.1 15 In an effort to gather support and raise
money for continuing legal expenses, Thomas-Rasset started a "Free
Jammie" blog 1 6 and sold a range of branded items ranging from a thong, to
a mug, to a dog T-shirt. 1 7 All items were branded with "Free Jammie.
Free Everyone."" 18 Thomas-Rasset felt as though she was on a mission on
behalf of "children, broke college students, [and] parents": "I feel I am in
the right position to try to help quite a few of these innocent victims of this
bullying." ' 1 9 The RIAA, with its team of investigators, lawyers, political
lobbyists, and financial resources was easily seen as the Goliath in this legal
battle. 12
0
Judge Michael J. Davis, presiding in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Minnesota, cited the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
precedent, Olan Mills, Inc. v. Linn Photo Co., 121 holding that an
investigator's role as agent does not mean that there is no infringement. 122
Therefore, in Thomas the RIAA could have based its distribution
infringement claim on this basis alone. 123
In addition, the RIAA alleged that Thomas-Rasset infringed its members'
copyrights when she made the files available over a filesharing network. 124
114. See Greg Sandoval, For RIAA, a Black Eye Comes with the Job, CNET NEWS, Oct.
9, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/For-RIAA%2C-a-black-eye-comes-with-the-job/2 100-
1027 3-6212374.html.
115. See Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2007)
(order denying motion to withdraw representation). The case was later renamed Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas after one record company withdrew, and finally renamed Capitol
Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset to reflect the correct name of the Defendant, Jammie
Thomas-Rasset. See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210; Special Verdict Form, Capitol Records,
Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. June 18, 2009).
116. See Free Jammie, http://freejammie.freeforums.org/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
Similarly, the defendant in the other filesharing case to complete a full jury trial also
established a "Joel Fights Back" website. See Joel Fights Back-It's about more than just
music, http://joelfightsback.com (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
117. See Greg Sandoval, Hate the RIAA ? Buy a 'Free Jammie' Thong, CNET NEWS, Oct.
29, 2007, http://news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9806599-7.html?hhTest-l; see also Free
Jammie Merchandise Store, http://www.cafepress.com/freejanimie (last visited Oct. 19,
2009).
118. Sandoval, supra note 117.
119. Jammie Thomas, I'm Fighting This Lawsuit for More Than Just Myself, DULUTH
NEWS TRIB., July 6, 2008, at B1, available at
http://beckermanlegal.com/Documents/080706DuluthNewsTribune.pdf.
120. See Sandoval, supra note 114 ("The image of a rich and gargantuan corporate entity
steamrolling a woman with limited resources is etched into the minds of many onlookers,
say public relations experts.").
121. 23 F.3d 1345 (8th Cir. 1994).
122. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1214-16 (D. Minn. 2008).
123. Id. at 1216 ("The Court holds that distribution to [the investigator] MediaSentry can
form the basis of an infringement claim.").
124. Complaint for Copyright Infringement at 4, Virgin Records Am., Inc. v. Thomas,
No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Apr. 19, 2006), 2006 WL 1431921.
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On the RIAA's suggestion, 125 the jury was instructed that making-available
violates the distribution right. 126
In an admirable admission that he suspected he had erred, Judge Davis
sua sponte asked both parties and amicus curiae to submit briefs for
consideration of a motion for new trial or remittitur on other grounds.12 7
He was concerned that he may have made a manifest error of law for two
reasons: (1) the jury instruction may have contradicted binding Eighth
Circuit precedent, National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Associates
International, Inc.,128 and (2) plaintiffs' proposed jury instruction 129 was in
part supported by Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell,130 which was later
overturned on the determination that there is no making-available right. 13'
Both parties and five amici submitted briefs regarding the making-
available jury instruction. 132 One observer noted that the briefs were
interesting not so much because of the arguments, since they had all been
raised before, but "because of the intensity of the argument."' 133 The
MPAA and the Progress and Freedom Foundation (PFF), 134 both funded by
content owners with corporate ties to the plaintiffs, 135 sided with the
125. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions at 10, Virgin, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Sept. 17,
2007), 2006 WL 4821318.
126. Jury Instructions at 18, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497) ("The act of
making copyrighted sound recordings available for electronic distribution on a peer-to-peer
network, without license from the copyright owners, violates the copyright owners'
exclusive right of distribution, regardless of whether actual distribution has been shown."
(emphasis added)).
127. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. May 15, 2008) (order
requesting briefs as to whether the making-available jury instruction was in error).
128. 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1993).
129. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, supra note 125, at 10.
130. No. CV06-02076-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 2409549 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007), vacated,
No. CV06-02076-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL 3010792 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007); Thomas, No.
06-1497 (D. Minn. May 15, 2008) (order requesting briefs as to whether the making-
available jury instruction was in error).
131. Howell, 2007 WL 3010792.
132. Defendant's Second Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Motion for New Trial,
Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008) (No. 06-1497);
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief Pursuant to May 15, 2008 Order, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (No. 06-1497).
133. Nate Anderson, Final RIAA/Jammie Thomas Briefs In; New Trial Decision Looms,
ARS TECHNICA, July 14, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20080714-final-
riaajammie-thomas-briefs-in-new-trial-decision-looms.html.
134. See About PFF, http://www.pff.org/about (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("The Progress
& Freedom Foundation is a market-oriented think tank that studies the digital revolution and
its implications for public policy. Its mission is to educate policyrnakers, opinion leaders
and the public about issues associated with technological change, based on a philosophy of
limited government, free markets and individual sovereignty.").
135. See MPAA Members Page, http://www.mpaa.org/AboutUsMembers.asp (last visited
Oct. 19, 2009) (explaining that the MPAA's Board of Directors consists of representatives
from Paramount Pictures Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment Inc., Twentieth Century
Fox Film Corporation, Universal City Studios LLP, Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures,
and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc.); PFF Supporters, http://www.pff.org/about/
supporters.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (explaining that the supporters of the Progress &
Freedom Foundation (PFF) include the following: AT&T, CBS Corporation, Comcast
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plaintiffs.136 The EFF, twelve copyright law professors, and the Intellectual
Property Institute of William Mitchell College of Law filed briefs in
support of Thomas-Rasset. 137 After consideration, Judge Davis vacated the
judgment and granted a new trial. 138 The RIAA filed a motion for
interlocutory appeal, 139 but Judge Davis denied the motion,' 40 and a new
trial was scheduled.' 41 In the new trial, without a making-available right,
the jury found that Thomas-Rasset violated the copyright owners'
distribution right and held her liable for $1,920,000,142 nearly nine times the
original $220,000 award. 143 Thomas-Rasset has appealed the decision. 144
In deciding on the making-available right, Judge Davis found that
National Car Rental was controlling Eighth Circuit precedent and that there
was no substantial basis for a difference in opinion as to whether there is a
making-available right. 145  Judge Davis found that "[t]he specter of
Corporation, Cox Enterprises, DIRECTV, EMI Group, Entertainment Software Association,
Intel Corporation, National Cable & Telecommunications Association, NBC Universal, The
News Corporation Limited, Sony & BMG Music Entertainment, Inc., Time Warner,
VeriSign, Inc., Verizon Communications, Viacom Inc., Vivendi, and The Walt Disney
Company). As Thomas-Rasset noted, both the MPAA and the PFF represent other
subsidiaries of the same parent companies of the plaintiffs in this case. See Defendant's
Second Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Motion for New Trial, supra note 132, at 4-
5 (pointing out that Sony Corporation, Vivendi, and EMI Group own companies that are
plaintiffs and other companies that have filed briefs as amici curiae).
136. See Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.,
Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497) [hereinafter MPAA Brief]; Amicus Curiae
Brief of Thomas D. Sydnor of the Progress & Freedom Foundation Opposing the Motion for
a New Trial, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497) [hereinafter PFF Brief].
137. See Brief Amici Curiae of Electronic Frontier Foundation, Public Knowledge,
United States Internet Industry Association, and Computer & Communications Industry
Association in Support of Defendant Jammie Thomas, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No.
06-1497) [hereinafter EFF Brief]; Brief of Copyright Law Professors as Amici Curiae in
Support of Defendant, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497) [hereinafter Professors'
Brief]; Memorandum of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Property Institute of William Mitchell
College of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (No. 06-1497).
138. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1226-27 ("Jury Instruction No. 15 was erroneous and
that error substantially prejudiced Thomas's rights. Based on the Court's error in instructing
the jury, it grants Thomas a new trial.").
139. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Certify September 24 Order for
Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal, Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d
1210 (No. 06-1497).
140. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497, 2008 WL 5423133, at *2 (D. Minn.
Dec. 23, 2008).
141. Date Certain Trial Notice at 1, Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-CV-1497
(D. Minn. Oct. 29, 2008).
142. Special Verdict Form, supra note 115, at 17-20.
143. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
144. Motion for a New Trial, Remittitur, and to Alter or Amend the Judgment, Thomas-
Rasset, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. July 6,2009).
145. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497, 2008 WL 5423133, at *1 (D. Minn.
Dec. 23, 2008) ("The Court holds that there is not substantial ground for difference of
opinion regarding whether distribution under § 106(3) requires actual dissemination. While
Plaintiffs can point to a number of courts from other jurisdictions that have disagreed with
this Court's conclusion, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explicitly held that actual
dissemination is required .. ").
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impossible-to-meet evidentiary standards ... is overstated," and the RIAA
has other viable alternatives: (1) the uploader violates the reproduction
right when making a copy to share, (2) the uploader is vicariously liable for
inducing infringement by others, or (3) the downloader is liable for
violation of the reproduction right. 146
II. COURTS AND OBSERVERS IN CONFLICT
Part I introduced filesharing and the music industry's lawsuits in
response, with particular focus on the Thomas case and the legal
underpinnings of the RIAA's claim of a making-available right. Part II
examines the arguments for and against a making-available right. Part JI.A
examines the statutory text of the Act. Part II.B then analyzes key courts of
appeals decisions, as well as district court decisions interpreting those
cases. Part II.C presents arguments relating to the WIPO treaties. Finally,
Part II.D provides a broad survey of alternatives to a making-available
right.
A. Statutory Text
Copyright is a statutory right, therefore statutory interpretation is the
primary basis for determining whether there is a making-available right.147
As Judge Davis found in Thomas, the "plain meaning" of the Act is not so
plain: "Each party asserts that the Court should adopt the plain meaning of
the term 'distribution;' however, they disagree on what that plain meaning
is." 14 8  Part II.A.1 discusses whether distribution and publication are
synonymous, thereby recognizing a making-available right. Part II.A.2
examines whether the right to authorize distribution is a making-available
right. Finally, Part II.A.3 evaluates whether a digital file is a "copy" or
"phonorecord" involving a "transfer of ownership" as required by the Act in
order to infringe the copyright owner's rights.
1. Are Distribution and Publication Synonymous?
The Act's definition of publication includes offering to distribute. 149 If
distribution and publication are synonymous, then distribution would
include offering to distribute, and there would be a making-available right.
The RIAA and several courts have noted that the wording of the first
sentence of the distribution right and the definition of publication are very
similar. 150 They consequently infer that the two terms are synonymous; the
146. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1225.
147. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
148. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1216.
149. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 240 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) ("The first sentence of Section 106(3) and the definition of 'publication' are virtually
identical."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) ("'Publication' is the distribution of copies or
phonorecords of a work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental,
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second sentence ("the offering to distribute") also applies to the definition
of distribution, and an offer to distribute infringes the distribution right. 151
However, other courts have disagreed 152 and found that, according to the
plain meaning of the Act, all distributions are publications, but not all
publications are distributions. 153  Judge Davis adopted this view in
Thomas. 15 4
It is also argued that the Supreme Court equated the two terms in Harper
& Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,155 when the Court quoted a
legislative committee report saying that § 106(3) established a statutory
right of first publication and that "'[u]nder this provision the copyright
owner would have the right to control the first public distribution of an
authorized copy.., of his work.""' 156 Others, including Judge Davis in
Thomas, have argued in response that Harper & Row held only that there
was a statutory right to first publication, with no reference to the definitions
of distribution or publication. 157
lease, or lending."); id § 106(3) (stating that the copyright owner has the exclusive right "to
distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending").
151. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., 930 F.2d 277, 299 (3d Cir. 1991)
("'Publication' and the exclusive right protected by section 106(3), then, are for all practical
purposes, synonymous."); Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d at 243 ("[T]he Court finds, using
Congress's words, that the distribution right of 106(3) may be infringed by '[t]he offer[ ] to
distribute .... ' (final two alterations in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)); Arista
Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Tex. 2006) ("The right of
distribution also has been identified as synonymous with the publication of a copyrighted
work."); Interscope Records v. Duty, No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006) ("'Distribute' is not defined under the Copyright Act, but the right of
distribution is synonymous with the right of publication, and 'publication' is defined under
the Copyright Act.") (citation omitted); Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398,
401 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ("The definition of 'publication' tracks the language of 17 U.S.C. §
106(3), which gives copyright holders the exclusive right 'to distribute copies... of the
copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending.' Section 106(3) therefore gives copyright holders the exclusive right of publication,
among the other exclusive rights.").
152. See, e.g., London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass.
2008) ("[E]ven a cursory examination of the statute suggests that the terms are not
synonymous.").
153. See id at 169 ("By the plain meaning of the statute, all 'distributions... to the
public' are publications. But not all publications are distributions to the public-the statute
explicitly creates an additional category of publications that are not themselves
distributions.").
154. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1220 (D. Minn. 2008)
("The Court concludes that simply because all distributions within the meaning of § 106(3)
are publications does not mean that all publications within the meaning of § 101 are
distributions. The statutory definition of publication is broader than the term distribution as
used in § 106(3).").
155. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
156. Id. at 552 (emphasis added) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 62 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5675).
157. See Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1220 ("In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court
narrowly addressed the issue of first publication. It did not discuss the meaning of the term
distribution; nor did it discuss publication or distribution in general."); London-Sire, 542 F.
Supp. 2d at 168 ("The Supreme Court stated only that § 106(3) 'recognized for the first time
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2. Is There an Exclusive Right "To Authorize" Distribution?
Under the Act, the copyright owner "has the exclusive rights to do and to
authorize.., to distribute."'158 This, says the RIAA, means that there is an
"4exclusive right to 'authorize' distribution."' 59 It argues that courts must
interpret the Act according to the ordinary meaning of "authorize,"' 160 and
they cite a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that
quotes the "to do and to authorize" language, but does not speak directly on
the alleged "authorization" right.161
Courts, however, have been seemingly unanimous in declaring that this
language does not create a separate "authorization" right 162 but, rather, that
"authorize" provides statutory support for third-party liability, 163 such as
contributory infringement, as found in Grokster. This interpretation rests
largely on legislative history as stated in the house report. 164 Judge Davis
agreed. 165
a distinct statutory right of first publication,' and quoted the legislative history as
establishing that § 106(3) gives a copyright holder 'the right to control the first public
distribution of an authorized copy.., of his work."' (quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at
552)).
158. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (emphasis added).
159. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 15.
160. Id. at 15-16 (citing dictionary definitions and court decisions defining
"authorization").
161. See Frasier v. Adams-Sandier, Inc., 94 F.3d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Section 106
grants the owner of a copyright 'the exclusive rights to do and to authorize' any of five
different activities[;] ... [b]ecause Frasier does not allege that Adams-Sandier used or
authorized the use of his copyrighted photographs, Adams-Sandier cannot be held liable as
an infringer.").
162. See, e.g., Venegas-Hemdndez v. Asociaci6n de Compositores y Editores de Mfisica
Latinoamericana, 424 F.3d 50, 57 (1st Cir. 2005) ("Because the right to 'authorize' is
literally one of the exclusive rights provided in section 106, the authorizing person could (as
a matter of language) be treated as an infringer subject to statutory damages even if no listed
infringing act (for example, performance) actually occurred. Yet the legislative origins of
the 'authorize' language in the statute arguably support a narrower reading, and most
(perhaps all) courts that have considered the question have taken the view that a listed
infringing act (beyond authorization) is required for a claim."); Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-
Pathe Commc'ns Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1094 (9th Cir. 1994) ("[W]e do not think Congress
intended to hold a party liable for merely 'authorizing' conduct that, had the authorizing
party chosen to engage in itself, would have resulted in no liability under the Act."); NFL v.
PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, No. 98 Civ. 3778, 1999 WL 163181, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24,
1999) ("In this Court's view, Subafilms is correct insofar as it holds that 17 U.S.C. § 106
does not create an infringeable right of authorization independent of infringement of one of
the specific enumerated rights set forth in that section.").
163. See Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1093 (explaining that ..... to authorize" [wa]s simply a
convenient peg on which Congress chose to hang the antecedent jurisprudence of third party
liability"' (alteration in original) (quoting 3 DAVID NIMMER & MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3][a], at 12-84 n. 81 (1993))).
164. Id. ("Use of the phrase 'to authorize' is intended to avoid any questions as to the
liability of contributory infringers." (emphasis omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674)).
165. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1221 (D. Minn. 2008) ("The
Court concludes that the authorization clause merely provides a statutory foundation for
secondary liability, not a means of expanding the scope of direct infringement liability.").
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The RIAA presented language from New York Times Co. v. Tasini,166
however, that Judge Davis could not easily dismiss. Tasini involved
electronic publishing database companies that made freelance writers'
articles electronically available in their database without the writers'
consent, but with the consent of the print publishers that originally
published the articles. 167  The Supreme Court decided that the print
publishers infringed the writers' exclusive rights when the print publishers
authorized the electronic publishers to publish the articles. 168 Spanning
several pages of the opinion, Judge Davis attempted to differentiate Tasini,
but nonetheless admitted that "the language cited by Plaintiffs could be
construed to indicate the Supreme Court's approval of an independent right
to authorize."'1 69 Judge Davis said that "as a whole" Tasini does not support
this interpretation and that Tasini addressed unauthorized copying rather
than distribution. 7 0 Judge Davis explained that the Supreme Court did not
recognize a making-available right, but only that the publisher would have
been vicariously liable had the works been actually downloaded (i.e.,
distributed). 17 1  The RIAA cited this point as presenting "substantial
grounds for disagreement" in its motion to appeal the vacated judgment. 172
3. Is a Digital File a "Copy or Phonorecord" and Is a Digital Transmission
a "Transfer of Ownership"?
Although not a line of argument raised in Thomas, if digital files and
digital transmissions do not fall under the Act, making them available over
a filesharing network would not infringe copyright owners' rights. The
EFF argued in its amicus curiae brief in Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc.
v. Barker173 that digital transmissions were not considered to be "material
objects" by Congress and Congress addressed digital transmissions in §
1 15(c)(3)(A), rather than in § 106(3). 174 However, in Tasini, the Supreme
166. 533 U.S. 483 (2001).
167. Id. at 487.
168. Id. at 506 ("We further conclude that the Print Publishers infringed the Authors'
copyrights by authorizing the Electronic Publishers to place the Articles in the Databases
and by aiding the Electronic Publishers in that endeavor." (emphasis added)).
169. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1222.
170. Id. at 1222-23.
171. Id. at 1222 ("[T]he Supreme Court was generally discussing the multiple exclusive
rights that are violated in the general scenario in which the Print Publisher provides copies of
the Articles to the Electronic Publishers, who distribute those copies to the public, who then
download the copies themselves.").
172. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Certify September 24 Order for
Interlocutory Appeal and for Stay of Proceedings Pending Appeal at 7, Capitol Records, Inc.
v. Thomas, No. 06-1497 (D. Minn. Oct. 14, 2008) ("[T]here are reasonable (and, Plaintiffs
believe, dispositive) arguments that the Supreme Court's decision in New York Times Co. v.
Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001), concludes that a work is distributed under Section 106(3)
when it is made available in a database from which others could download it.").
173. 551 F. Supp. 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
174. See EFF Brief 2, supra note 99, at 3-7. The EFF also argues that Congress
specifically chose not to amend § 106(3) when it enacted the Artists' Rights and Theft
Prevention (ART) Act of 2005 and the No Electronic Theft (NET) Act. Id. at 6.
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Court seemingly presumed that electronic-only distribution is the
distribution of a material object, and the lower courts have followed suit. 175
In addition, digital transmissions may not infringe the distribution right
under the Act: to infringe the owner's distribution right, a "transfer" is
required. 176 When one person owns a physical CD containing music and
sells it to another person for five dollars, the CD changes hands. It is clear
that there has been a sale and a transfer of ownership. But when one person
has a file on a computer and another person makes a copy of that file
through a filesharing network, the first person still has the original file and
no money has been exchanged. There has been no transfer of ownership of
the original file and no rental, lease, or lending as required by § 106(3).177
Professor Jane Ginsburg has said that taking § 106(3) together with the
definition of digital phonorecord delivery in § 115(d), and other parts of the
Act may "effectively enlarge the definition of distribution," and that many
courts have taken a common-sense position that it is distribution.1 78 Still, §
106(3) is what ultimately defines the distribution right, and the EFF argued
that "it is telling that Congress specifically chose not to amend § 106(3)"; 179
EFF cited a Senate report saying that "reading § 106(3) to include digital
transmissions was controversial and 'express[ing] no view on current law in
this regard."1 80
175. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007)
(citing Tasini and saying that "[t]he Supreme Court has indicated that in the electronic
context, copies may be distributed electronically"); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542
F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (citing Tasini and holding that "[t]he electronic file
(or, perhaps more accurately, the appropriate segment of the hard disk) is therefore a
'phonorecord' within the meaning of the statute"); Arista Records LLC v. Greubel, 453 F.
Supp. 2d 961, 968 (N.D. Tex. 2006) (citing Tasini and stating that "even if the statutory
language is arguably ambiguous on this point, the courts have not hesitated to find copyright
infringement by distribution in cases of file-sharing or electronic transmission of copyrighted
works" before holding that copies may be distributed electronically); see also Part I.B.2.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
177. Id.
178. "Making Available" Transcript From March 28th Fordham Law School IP Law
Conference, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/2008/05/transcript-of-march-
28th-fordham-law.html (May 2, 2008, 17:52 EST) (stating that courts "have taken the
common-sense position that if the recipient ends up with copies and the recipient got those
copies because of a process that was triggered by the defendant, that is a distribution"). In
addition, Jane Ginsburg's coauthor Jessica Litman has "pointed out that the courts have done
quite a job of interpreting the Copyright Act while ignoring the text. So in that case,
common sense might prevail." Id.; see also Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1162 (dealing with the
issue of "material object" and "transfer" in one sentence: "The Supreme Court has indicated
that in the electronic context, copies may be distributed electronically." (citing New York
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 488 (2001))).
179. Amicus Curiae Brief of the Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint at 6, Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Barker,
551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 05-CV-7340).
180. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 104-128, at 17 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.A.A.N. 357,
364) (citing Reese, supra note 99, at 133).
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B. Case Law
Part II.A examined arguments for and against a making-available right
based on the statutory text of the Act. But the determination of copyright
infringement has not been based on statutory wording alone. The Supreme
Court held in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 181 that
"[t]he absence of such express language in the copyright statute does not
preclude the imposition of liability for copyright infringements" and
proceeded to apply the common law concept of vicarious liability, which is
"imposed in virtually all areas of the law," to investigate whether Sony was
liable for contributory infringement. 182  Part II.B.1 explains that the
making-available right was first found in Hotaling, rather than in the Act.
As evidence of support for Hotaling, the RIAA regularly cites one line from
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's Napster case, which is
evaluated in Part II.B.2. In Thomas, Judge Davis was subject to Eighth
Circuit binding precedent in National Car Rental, which is examined in
Part II.B.3. Part II.B.4 explains that Judge Davis also likely felt bound to
heed the weight of authority of other district court decisions.
1. The Fourth Circuit: Hotaling
Hotaling originated the making-available right, but it has been heavily
criticized, particularly in Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell.183 As
mentioned earlier, the court in Hotaling was concerned with the potential
for an inequitable result where an infringer would face no liability because
the infringer did not himself maintain records of such infringement. 184 The
courts have criticized Hotaling for a lack of supporting precedent 85 and for
ignoring the plain meaning of the statute. 186  Judge Davis criticized
Hotaling for a lack of precedent, and for being inconsistent with the Act. 187
He found that the Fourth Circuit "was guided by equitable concerns." 188
The Howell opinion also provides a broad survey of district court decisions
on the making-available right, mentioning that some have declined to
181. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
182. Id. at 435.
183. 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("The majority of district courts have
rejected the recording companies' 'making available' theory because Hotaling is inconsistent
with the Copyright Act.").
184. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
185. See id. ("'Respectfully, Hotaling did not cite any precedent in holding that making
copyrighted works available to the public constitutes infringement... [its] interpretation,
even if sound public policy, is not grounded in the statute."' (quoting Barker, 551 F. Supp.
2d at 242-43)).
186. See id. ("noting a 'lacuna in the Fourth Circuit's reasoning' because '[i]t is a
"distribution" that the statute plainly requires' (alteration in original) (quoting London-Sire
Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 168 (D. Mass. 2008))); id. ("declining to apply
Hotaling because it is contrary to the weight of authority and 'inconsistent with the text and
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976"' (quoting In re Napster, 377 F. Supp. 2d
796, 803 (N.D. Cal. 2005))).
187. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1224-25 (D. Minn. 2008).
188. Id. at 1224.
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decide the issue entirely, 89 and others have refused motions to dismiss
without ruling on the issue. 190
Remarkably, in Howell, Judge Neil Wake reversed his own previous
decision' 9' that the RIAA cited in Thomas as support for the making-
available Jury Instruction No. 15.192 This in part prompted Judge Davis to
reconsider his own decision regarding Jury Instruction No. 15 in Thomas. 193
2. The Ninth Circuit: Napster & Perfect 10
In arguing for a making-available right, the RIAA often relies on a
statement in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 194 a Ninth Circuit case
that said "Napster users who upload file names to the search index for
others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights."'195 Similarly, the first
Howell decision cited Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 196 for the
proposition that "'the owner of a collection of works who makes them
available to the public may be deemed to have distributed copies of the
works." ' 197 Although the quoted line from Perfect 10 was summarizing
Hotaling's holding, 198 Perfect 10 went on to say that individual Napster
users violated the copyright owners' distribution rights "when they used the
Napster software to make their collections available to all other Napster
users."'199 Perfect 10 considered the liability of Google, rather than
individual computer network users, and held that Google did not distribute
189. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 982-83 (citing Interscope Records v. Leadbetter, No.
C05-1149-MJP-RSL, 2007 WL 1217705, at *3-4 (W.D. Wa. Apr. 23, 2007)); see also
Maverick Recording Co. v. Goldshteyn, No. CV-05-4523, 2006 WL 2166870, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2006) ("[T]he 'making available' argument need not be decided
here .... [S]uch details are rightly the province of the discovery phase and summary
judgment.").
190. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 ("To be clear, we do not conclude that the mere
presence of copyrighted sound recordings in Duty's share file constitutes copyright
infringement. We have an incomplete understanding of the Kazaa technology at this stage."
(citing Interscope Records v. Duty, No. 05CV3744-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 988086, at *3 n.3
(D. Ariz. Apr. 14, 2006))); id ("[T]he Court is not prepared at this stage of the proceedings
to rule out the Plaintiffs' 'making available' theory as a possible ground for imposing
liability." (alteration in original) (citing Warner Bros. Records, Inc. v. Payne, No. W-06-CA-
051, 2006 WL 2844415, at *4 (W.D. Tex. July 17, 2006))).
191. Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076-PHiX-NVW, 2007 WL 2409549
(D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2007), rev'd, Atl. Recording Corp. v. Howell, No. CV06-02076-PHX-
NVW, 2007 WL 3010792 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007).
192. Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, supra note 125, at 10.
193. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497, at 2-3 (D. Minn. May 15, 2008)
(order requesting briefs as to whether the making-available jury instruction was in error).
194. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
195. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014.
196. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007).
197. Howell, 2007 WL 2409549, at *3, rev'd, CV06-02076-PHX-NVW, 2007 WL
3010792 (D.Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (quoting PerfectlO, 487 F.3d at 718-19).
198. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 718-19 ("Hotaling held that the owner of a collection of
works who makes them available to the public may be deemed to have distributed copies of
the works.").
199. Id. at 719 (citing Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011-14).
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images when it provided user access to thumbnail images via its Internet
search engine. 20 0 Although not directly on point since this case addressed a
network provider like Napster rather than individual users like Jammie
Thomas-Rasset, the principle enunciated was part of the rationale of the
decision rather than dicta.
In reversing its first decision, Howell argued that in Napster there was no
analysis, explanation, or cited precedent, and that the language relied on by
RIAA was dicta since actual dissemination had not been in dispute. 20 1
Howell went on to point out that Perfect 10 found that "'the district court's
conclusion [that distribution requires an "actual dissemination"] is
consistent with the language of the Copyright Act,"' 20 2 which "contradicts
Hotaling and casts doubt on the single unsupported line from Napster upon
which the recording companies rely. '20 3 In Thomas, Judge Davis did not
address Napster or Perfect 10 in vacating the judgment. 20 4
3. The Eighth Circuit: National Car Rental
Judge Davis requested briefs on the making-available jury instruction in
part because of Howell, but also because of Eighth Circuit precedent. 20 5 In
the request, Davis cited National Car Rental and its statement that
"' [i]nfringement of [the distribution right] requires an actual dissemination
of either copies or phonorecords."' 206
The RIAA pointed out that the making-available right was not at issue in
National Car Rental, and therefore argued that the statement is dicta.207
The sentence preceding the key statement in National Car Rental stated that
"the distribution right is only the right to distribute copies of the work, '208
indicating that the statement was intended only to clarify what must be
distributed (copies), rather than how it must be distributed (actual
200. Id.
201. Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 982 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("The
court cited no precedent and offered no analysis in explanation of that statement. Its review
of the issue was cursory because neither party disputed that Napster users were using the
system to disseminate actual, unauthorized copies of copyrighted works to the public. The
central issue in the case was secondary liability for the creators of the Napster file-sharing
system." (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001)).
202. Id(quoting Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 718).
203. Id.
204. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210 (D. Minn. 2008).
205. See Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, No. 06-1497, at 2 (D. Minn. May 15, 2008)
(order requesting briefs as to whether the making-available jury instruction was in error)
("[T]he Court is concerned that Jury Instruction No. 15 may have been contrary to binding
Eighth Circuit precedent.").
206. Id. (quoting Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d
426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993)).
207. See Plaintiffs' Reply Brief Pursuant to May 15, 2008 Order at 8, Thomas, 579 F.
Supp. 2d 1210 (No. 06-1497).
208. Nat'l Car Rental, 991 F.2d at 434.
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dissemination). Defendants countered that this context did not detract from
the statement of basic legal principles, 20 9 and Judge Davis agreed.210
The argument is that since actual dissemination of a copy was one of the
grounds for the National Car Rental decision, rather than dictum, the
Eighth Circuit has considered and rejected a making-available right.211
This binding precedent contradicted to Jury Instruction No. 15, which
necessitated a new trial.
4. District Court Decisions
Beyond Howell, Napster, and Hotaling, in Thomas the RIAA cited two
other district court cases in support for the making-available Jury
Instruction No. 15.212 The first, BMG Music v. Gonzalez,213 stated that
Grokster's finding of contributory infringement was founded on "a belief
that people who post or download music files are primary infringers. ' '214
However, making-available was not in dispute in the case since
reproduction, rather than distribution, was at issue. 215 The second, Sony
Music Corp. v. Scott,2 16 also involved a defendant admission of
infringement by making unauthorized reproductions.21 7
In Thomas, Judge Davis did not cite heavily other district court decisions,
but he did cite Howell repeatedly in vacating the judgment. 218 Howell
stated that "the great weight of authority" of district court decisions have
concluded that there is no making-available right,219 but did acknowledge
two cases that recognized a making-available right.220 Universal City
Studios Productions LLP v. Bigwood221 dealt with the issue in one sentence,
citing Hotaling and Napster, with no further analysis of the issue.222
Motown Record Co. v. DePietro223 relegated its analysis of the issue to a
209. See Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 69, at 19.
210. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 1224-25.
211. Id. at 1223 ("[T]he appellate court has, in fact, addressed and rejected the making-
available argument.").
212. See Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instructions, supra note 125, at 10.
213. 430 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2005).
214. Id. at 889 (emphasis added).
215. Id. (explaining that the court's findings of fact included that "[iut is undisputed,
however, that she downloaded more than 1,370 copyrighted songs").
216. No. 03 Civ. 6886, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46848 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2005).
217. Id. at *3 ("Based on the admissions entered against Defendant and Plaintiffs'
submissions, the Court finds it clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to
Defendant's liability for infringing Plaintiffs' copyrights.").
218. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1215, 1220, 1223 (D. Minn.
2008).
219. At. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008).
220. Id.
221. 441 F. Supp. 2d 185 (D. Me. 2006).
222. Id. at 190-91 ("[B]y using KaZaA to make copies of the Motion Pictures available
to thousands of people over the intemet, Defendant violated Plaintiffs' exclusive right to
distribute the Motion Pictures.").
223. No. 04-CV-2246, 2007 WL 576284 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007).
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single footnote.224 In addition, most cases not cited in Howell that have
concluded that there is a making-available right have given the issue no
more than cursory review. In Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v.
Perez,225 the court simply concluded that the plaintiff had sufficiently
alleged that the defendant had made the copyrighted works available, with
no analysis or support. 226 In Atlantic Recording Corp. v. Anderson,227 the
court stated that "it is self-evident" that making-available violates the
distribution right.228 It came to this reasoning by equating publication with
distribution, citing Harper & Row. 229
Similarly, in denying a making-available right, Atlantic Recording Corp.
v. Brennan230 allocated the issue two sentences in which it concluded that
making-available was "problematic," citing a passage from William Patry's
copyright treatise and Perfect 10 as support.231 On the whole, however,
most decisions denying a making-available right have offered more
thorough analysis than those recognizing a making-available right. 232
Thomas itself dealt squarely with the issue in a nineteen-page opinion.233
C. WIPO Treaty Obligations
Part II.A examined the statutory text of the Act, and Part II.B analyzed
the key court of appeals cases, as well as district court decisions interpreting
224. Id. at *3 n.38 (making its determination "based on its reading of the statute, the
important decision in A & MRecords, Inc. v. Napster, Inc, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001),
and the opinion offered by the Register of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters").
225. No. 05-931, 2006 WL 3063493 (D. Or. Oct. 25, 2006).
226. See id. at *2 ("[P]laintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges that defendant used an
online media distribution system, among other things, to make the copyrighted recordings
available for distribution to others. Additionally, plaintiffs' Amended Complaint refers to
'Exhibit B' attached to the complaint, which allegedly represents music files being shared by
user 'perez@KaZaA' at the time plaintiffs' investigator conducted the investigation.
Although defendant disagrees that Exhibit B is such a representation, I must construe all
allegations in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. I find that Exhibit B, in the context of the
allegations in the Complaint, supports plaintiffs' allegation that defendant made copyrighted
materials available for distribution."). Note also that this decision was made with very little
at stake: the RIAA proposed to dismiss the case without prejudice, while the defendant
wanted to dismiss the case with prejudice. See id. at * 1-4.
227. No. H-06-3578, 2008 WL 2316551 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2008).
228. Id. at *8 ("[lIt is self-evident that Defendant's actions in placing Plaintiffs'
Copyrighted Recordings in a shared folder accessible to numerous other persons on KaZaA
constituted a 'distribution' for the purposes of Plaintiffs' copyright infringement claim
against Defendant.").
229. Id. at *7.
230. 534 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Conn. 2008).
231. Id. at 281-82 (citing Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1162 (9th
Cir. 2007); 4 PATRY, supra note 101, § 13:9 & n.10 (2007)).
232. See, e.g., Venegas-Hernndez v. Asociaci6n de Compositores y Editores de Mdisica
Latinoamericana, 424 F.3d 50, 57-59 (1st Cir. 2005) (3 pages); AtI. Recording Corp. v.
Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 981-85 (D. Ariz. 2008) (5 pages); Elektra Entm't Group, Inc.
v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 239-47 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (7 pages); London-Sire Records,
Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 166-75 (D. Mass. 2008) (10 pages); Obolensky v. G.P.
Putnam's Sons, 628 F. Supp. 1552, 1555 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (3 paragraphs).
233. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1210-28 (D. Minn. 2008).
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those cases. Part II.C presents arguments relating to the WIPO treaties.
Part II.C.1 introduces the RIAA's argument that international treaties
require that the United States recognize a making-available right. Part
II.C.2 then examines whether federal government interpretations of the Act
are consistent with international treaties that demonstrate that there is a
making-available right.
1. WIPO Treaties
The RJAA argued in Thomas that the two WIPO treaties recognizing a
making-available right (WCT and WPPT) are significant because to
conclude that § 106(3) does not include a making-available right would
conflict with international obligations. 234 The defendant's arnici countered
that international treaties are not self-executing, meaning that participating
nations need to pass their own domestic laws to enact the provisions, and
therefore they are not controlling. 235 Even if the WIPO treaties create a
making-available right, § 106(3) is arguably only concerned with
identifying what rights give rise to a damages remedy (i.e., WIPO treaties
may create a making-available right without recourse to a remedy of
damages). 236
The PFF and MPAA argue that the "Charming Betsy" rule of statutory
construction should control, where a statute should not be interpreted to
conflict with international treaties if any alternative interpretation is
plausible. 2 37 They argue that this rule respects the principles of separation
of powers and comity by preventing the judiciary from interfering with the
President's and Congress's exclusive powers 238 and by allowing the
President and Congress to uphold their international treaty obligations. 239
William Patry, an author of one of the leading copyright treatises,
responded that the "Charming Betsy" rule only applies when a statute is
ambiguous, and is "merely a canon of construction." 240 In what became a
234. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 26-28.
235. See Professors' Brief, supra note 137, at 9 n.1 (noting that the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) treaties, like all intellectual property treaties, are not self-
executing in the United States).
236. Defendant's Second Memorandum, supra note 132, at 13 ("All that the Copyright
Act does is confer a set of very specific exclusive rights that if infringed permits a remedy of
damages, statutory or actual.").
237. MPAA Brief, supra note 136, at 4 (citing Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)) ("[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."); see also PFF Brief,
supra note 136, at 11 ("'Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so
as not to conflict with international law or an international agreement of the United States."'
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 114 (1987)).
238. See PFF Brief, supra note 136, at 12.
239. Id. at 13.
240. The Patry Copyright Blog, MPAA's Brief and the Charming Betsy,
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2008/06/mpaas-brief-and-charming-betsy.html (June 24,
2008, 10:50 EDT).
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heated debate, the RIAA argued that Patry's argument derived from a
conflict of interest. 241
In Thomas, Judge Davis found that the treaties are not self-executing and
therefore not binding. 242 Regarding the "Charming Betsy" rule, Judge
Davis wrote that the RIAA's understanding of the distribution right is
"simply not reasonable." 243 Because of a lack of ambiguity, then, the
"Charming Betsy" rule need not be invoked in the analysis.
2. Government Interpretation of U.S. Laws as Compliant with WIPO
Treaties
The RIAA argued in response that the fact that the treaties are not self-
executing is "beside the point," and that they are important instead because
they demonstrate that Congress, the President, and other executive agencies
considered the issue "head-on" 244 and concluded that there is a making-
available right. 245 The RIAA quoted Bruce Lehman, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) Commissioner speaking at a House Committee
Hearing, saying that "'nothing in these Treaties or implementing legislation
affects the issue of liability for particular acts of copyright
infringement."'' 246 Also quoted was Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of
State, saying "'the Department of State unequivocally endorses the WIPO
Copyright Treaty and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty.' ' 247  The House Judiciary Committee was also quoted: "'[t]he
treaties do not require any change in the substance of copyright rights or
exceptions in U.S. law."' 248 The RIAA argued that Congress passed the
241. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 207, at 9 n.4 ("Mr. Patry's antipathy for the
making-available right is well known and may derive from his role as Senior Copyright
Counsel to Google, which has litigated this issue against copyright owners.").
242. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1226 (D. Minn. 2008) ("The
WIPO treaties are not self-executing and lack any binding legal authority separate from their
implementation through the Copyright Act. .. . Therefore, the fact that the WIPO treaties
protect a making-available right does not create an enforceable making-available right for
Plaintiffs in this Court." (citing 17 U.S.C. § 104(c), (d); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346,
1365 (2008); Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir, 2005)).
243. Id.
244. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 27.
245. Plaintiffs' Reply Brief, supra note 207, at 13 ("The WIPO treaties are relevant
because in the course of determining whether existing law satisfied the treaties'
requirements, Congress, the President, and other Executive agencies concluded that the
Copyright Act does protect the making-available right.").
246. Id. at 27 n. 10 (quoting WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online
Copyright Liability Limitation Act Hearing on HR. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong. 37 (1997) (statement of Bruce A. Lehman, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and
Comm'r of Patents and Trademarks)).
247. Id. (quoting WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) (1996) and WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty (WWPT) (1996), S. Exnc. REP. No. 105-25, at 29 (1998) (statement of
Alan Larson, Assistant Secretary of State)).
248. Id. at 27 (alteration in original) (quoting WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation
And On-Line Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation, H.R. REP. No. 105-551(1), at 9
(1998)).
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implementation bill based on the executive agencies' assurances that the
Act complied with the treaties, 249 and that they therefore interpreted the Act
as including a making-available right.
The opinions of the Copyright Office, the administrative agency
responsible for the execution of the Act, are also relevant.250 The plaintiffs
quoted Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, as saying "'[a]fter an
extensive analysis the Copyright Office concluded that existing protections
are adequate to fulfill all but two of the substantive treaty obligations,"' and
neither of those were related to the making-available right.251 She further
stated that the implementation bill "'fully and adequately implements the
obligations of the [new WIPO] treaties."' 25 2  Most importantly, Peters
wrote that "'making [a work] available for other users of [a] peer to peer
network to download . . . constitutes an infringement of the exclusive
distribution right.' ' 253  As the recording companies argued, "[t]hat
interpretation is entitled to particular respect. '254  Notably, the very
Supreme Court case the RIAA cited as support stated that "[a]lthough we
would ordinarily give weight to the [agency's] interpretation of an
ambiguous statute ... we ... do not rely on it in this instance." 255 Despite
the fact that lower courts have disagreed on statutory interpretation, the EFF
argued that § 106(3) is in no way ambiguous, 256 and therefore the opinion
of the Register of Copyrights is irrelevant.
D. Proposed Alternatives to Making-Available
Part II.C presented arguments relating to WIPO treaties. Part II.D
surveys alternatives to a making-available right. Part II.D. 1 explains that in
addressing the making-available right, there may be a role for "tolerated
249. See id ("Relying on this testimony, Congress implemented the treaties in full.").
250. Great N. Ry. Co. v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 275 (1942) ("Also pertinent to the
construction of the Act is the contemporaneous administrative interpretation placed on it by
those charged with its execution.").
251. Plaintiffs' Supplemental Brief, supra note 72, at 27 (quoting WIPO Copyright
Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act Hearing on H.R.
2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43-44 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights)).
252. Id. at 27-28 (alteration in original) (quoting WIPO Copyright Treaties
Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act Hearing on H.R. 2281
and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 43 (1997) (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of
Copyrights)).
253. Id. at 9 (quoting Letter from Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, to Rep.
Howard L. Berman, Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet and Intellectual Prop. 1 (Sept. 25,
2002), reprinted in Piracy of Intellectual Property on Peer-to-Peer Networks, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 114 (2002)).
254. Id. (citing De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1956)).
255. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1956).
256. See EFF Brief, supra note 137, at 6 ("The distribution right encompasses only the
distribution of certain things ('copies or phonorecords'), to certain people ('the public'), in
certain ways ('by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending').").
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use," where not all legally infringing uses are prosecuted by copyright
owners. In addition, Part II.D.2 explains that it appears as though many
judges have accepted that making-available may be considered as
circumstantial evidence of infringement as part of the overall infringement
claim, rather than as direct evidence of infringement on its own. Part II.D.3
surveys international case law with regard to filesharing and the making-
available right. Part II.D.4 looks at proposed and enacted international
legislation to address making-available and filesharing. Finally, Part II.D.5
presents a proposed agreement in the United States between the RIAA and
ISPs to enforce copyright by denying Internet access to individuals who
violate copyright.
1. Tolerated Use
Professor Tim Wu argues that, in practice, many copyright infringements
are just not enforced, leading to "tolerated use": "a system that declares
many inoffensive activities illegal, with the tacit understanding that the law
will usually not be enforced, leaving sanctions hanging overhead like
copyright's own Sword of Damocles.' '257 Wu argues that fan websites are
often tolerated because many copyright owners see this type of
infringement as a good thing.258 He also says that "suing adolescents who
worship your product may not be the ideal way to promote the product. '259
Professor Lawrence Lessig concurs and argues that the RIAA lawsuits are
"rendering a generation criminal. '260
The argument, then, is that courts should acknowledge and adapt to
society's values, which to date have tolerated certain types of infringing
use. Timothy Lee of the Cato Institute argues that, historically, copyright
has regulated the commercial use of works and that to allow noncommercial
filesharing would be consistent with the history of copyright law. 261 He
says that only since filesharing has arrived has noncommercial use
threatened the content industry's existence. 262  He proposes, then, that
copyright law focus on commercial actors, who are easier to regulate and
257. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use: The Copyright Problem, SLATE, Oct. 16, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/2175730/entry/2175731/.
258. Id.
259. Id,
260. Lawrence Lessig, Don't Make Kids Online Crooks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec.
22-29, 2008, at 15.
261. Timothy B. Lee, Two Paths for Copyright Law, CATO INSTITUTE, June 11, 2008,
http://www.cato-unbound.org/2008/06/1 1itim-lee/two-paths-for-copyright-law/
("[L]egalization of non-commercial filesharing looks less like a radical departure from
copyright's past, and more like an incremental adjustment to technological change."). "Mix
tapes and libraries of recorded movies may have been technically illegal, but Hollywood and
the major labels recognized that they weren't a big enough threat to their bottom line to be
worth suing customers over." Id
262. Id. ("But as the 21st century dawned, technological progress brought this latent
ambiguity in copyright law into stark relief. Peer-to-peer filesharing transformed non-
commercial home copying from a minor nuisance to an existential threat to the recording
industry.").
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possess more resources to cope with complex copyright laws. 263  In
Thomas, Judge Davis seemed to agree in principle, stating that the damage
award was excessive for noncommercial use.
264
To avoid the "Sword of Damocles" potential liability with "tolerated
use," Creative Commons advocates a spectrum of rights. Rather than all or
nothing, they offer an option for "some rights reserved. '265 Owners are in
control: copyright owners describe which uses are infringing and which are
not. This arguably avoids "fostering disdain for copyright protection"
266
where society does not respect copyright laws. 267 Lessig advocates striking
a proper "balance between anarchy and control" so that creativity is not
inordinately restricted by laws. 268
2. Circumstantial Evidence
As pointed out in a recent article,269 courts may consider the making-
available of files as circumstantial evidence together with other evidence to
support an inference of infringement. In Thomas, Judge Davis agreed.
270
263. Id.
264. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1228 (D. Minn. 2008) ("Her
status as a consumer who was not seeking to harm her competitors or make a profit does not
excuse her behavior. But it does make the award of hundreds of thousands of dollars in
damages unprecedented and oppressive."). Presumably Judge Michael J. Davis would be
even more alarmed at the retrial verdict of $1,920,000. See supra note 142 and
accompanying text.
265. See About Creative Commons, www.creativecommons.org/about/what-is-cc (last
visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("Creative Commons defines the spectrum of possibilities between full
copyright and the public domain. From all rights reserved to no rights reserved. Our
licenses help you keep your copyright while allowing certain uses of your work - a 'some
rights reserved' copyright.").
266. MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005) (citing Tim Wu, When
Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 679, 724-26 (2003)); see also Lessig, supra note 260, at 15
("[Our kids] get used to being criminal. This fact is deeply corrosive. As with Prohibition, it
is profoundly corrupting. And over time, it will only weaken our kids' respect for the law.").
267. See Lessig, supra note 260, at 15 ("A concerted campaign by rights holders,
politicians, school administrators, and increasingly parents has convinced kids that their
behavior violates the law. But that law breaking continues.").
268. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USEs TECHNOLOGY
AND THE LAW To LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 3 (Landscape Letter ed.
2004), available at http://www.jus.uio.no/sisu/free-culture.lawrence-lessig/
landscape.letter.pdf.
269. Robert Kasunic, Making Circumstantial Proof of Distribution Available, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1145 (2008).
270. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1225 (D. Minn. 2008)
("[D]irect proof of actual dissemination is not required by the Copyright Act. Plaintiffs are
free to employ circumstantial evidence to attempt to prove actual dissemination.").
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Howell recognized this possibility,2 71 and London-Sire Records, Inc. v.
Doe 1272 said explicitly that where direct evidence is impossible to produce,
a "chain of inferences" is permitted.2 73 Arista Records, Inc. v. Mp3Board,
Inc.274 did not find that making-available was infringement because the
"record companies had not shown that proof of particular instances of use
by the public was 'impossible to produce."' '275 Even Hotaling can be
viewed in this light: Patry said that Hotaling can be best defended as a
decision based on "evidentiary probability. '276
3. International Case Law
Internationally, courts have had varying approaches to the making-
available right. In Hong Kong, a man was criminally convicted of illegally
distributing copyrighted movies by placing the files in a share folder on a
filesharing network. 2 77  The court found that "[t]his was not merely
'making available' the BitTorrent files. These were positive acts by the
defendant, leading to the distribution of the data. He intended that
result. ' 278 The "positive acts" included creating images of the inlay cards
and imprinting them with his logo, publishing the file availability on a
newsgroup, and keeping his computer connected to enable others to
download.2 79 Interestingly, Hong Kong's statute does not directly define
"distribution" either, but the lower court found no ambiguity in the terms of
the statute. 280 On appeal, the court quoted Hotaling and emphasized that
the defendant "had done all that was necessary to fulfill the criteria for
distribution." 28 1  On final appeal, the court found that the defendant's
computer made a copy of the file before sending it via the Internet to
downloaders and that this in the aggregate was distribution, rather than
making-available. This also settled the question of whether or not a
271. See At. Recording Corp. v. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (D. Ariz. 2008) ("As
Hotaling seems to suggest, evidence that a defendant made a copy of a work available to the
public might, in conjunction with other circumstantial evidence, support an inference that the
copy was likely transferred to a member of the public."). On its own, though, making-
available "only shows that the defendant attempted to distribute the copy, and there is no
basis for attempt liability in the statute, no matter how desirable such liability may be as a
matter of policy." Id. at 984.
272. 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008).
273. id. at 177 ("In considering this question, the Court must keep in mind that transfers
on a peer-to-peer network are not observable by outside users. To show infringement, the
plaintiffs are obliged to build a chain of inferences.").
274. No. 00 CIV. 4660(SHS), 2002 WL 1997918 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2002).
275. Howell, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 983 (quoting MP3Board, 2002 WL 1997918, at *4).
276. See id. at 984 ("'The majority's decision [in Hotaling] can be saved only if it is read
to rest on an evidentiary probability that there had been an actual loan of the copy.'
(quoting PATRY, supra note 101, at 13-15)).
277. HKSAR v. Chan Nai Ming, [2005] 4 H.K.L.R.D. 142 (Magistrates' Court).
278. Id. at 151.
279. Id.
280. HKSAR v. Chan Nai Ming, [2007] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 95, 100 (C.F.I.).
281. Id. at 108-09.
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"transfer" had taken place, and whether the file was a "copy. '282 The court
used an analogy of a coin-operated soft drink vending machine, where the
operator has taken all the steps necessary to sell, but the buyer must insert
the money and the machine itself, rather than the operator, delivers the
drink: the operator has still distributed the drink, even though the machine
itself physically delivers the drink to the buyer.283
Some jurisdictions have permitted downloading (taking a file from the
filesharing network), but not uploading (making-available). In Canada, the
Copyright Board has ruled that downloading is legal, but uploading is
not.2 84 This in part led the RIAA to add Canada to its "Priority List. '28 5
After a recent ruling, the Netherlands no longer permits downloading of
illegal copies of copyrighted materials. 28 6 One pretrial ruling in Spain has
determined that private sharing between users of a filesharing network
without profit does not violate copyright laws, 287 thereby lending support to
Timothy Lee's view that noncommercial use should be permitted. 288
With regards to filesharing network operators rather than individuals,
Australia had its own KaZaa case,289 which was decided similarly to
Grokster.290 The Pirate Bay was also held liable in a recent trial in
282. HKSAR v. Chan Nai Ming, [2007] 2 H.K.L.R.D. 489, 501 (C.F.A.) ("[T]he
evidence showed that upon being accessed by downloaders seeking to obtain a copy of the
relevant film, the appellant's computer reproduced the infringing electronic copy (which
remained on his hard disk) in the form of packets of digital information which were sent to
the downloaders and reassembled by their computers in the correct sequence to constitute an
entire infringing copy of that film. In my view, that process in aggregate is aptly described
as involving the appellant's creation of infringing electronic copies (transient or otherwise)
of the film and their distribution directly or indirectly to each member of each swarm."); see
also id. at 506 (holding that even if no copy was made on the original computer, "[t]he fact
would remain that by his use of technology the appellant had caused reproductions of the
infringing copies on his computer to appear on the computers of the downloaders, even if the
process did not involve the prior creation by his computer of an electronic copy (transient or
otherwise)").
283. Id. at 505.
284. See John Borland, Canada Deems P2P Downloading Legal, CNET NEWS, Dec. 12,
2003, http://news.cnet.com/2100-1025 3-5121479.html ("'As far as computer hard drives
are concerned, we say that for the time being, it is still legal,' said Claude Majeau, secretary
general of the Copyright Board.").
285. See Press Release, RIAA, Congressional International Anti-piracy Caucus Releases
Priority Country (May 15, 2008), http://www.riaa.com/newsitem.phpid=7D79DA80-38AB-
6667-121C-16FE883BD080.
286. Tom Sanders, Dutch Court Rules Against Law That Allowed File Downloading, PC
WORLD, June 27, 2008, http://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/index.php/id;1262747976 ("The
Netherlands currently have a unique legal situation where downloading of copyrighted
materials is allowed and only uploading is forbidden. The judge now ruled that when the
original source is illegal, any copies too should be considered illegal.").
287. Posting of Enigmax to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/judge-rules-p2p-legal-
sites-to-be-presumed-innocent-090707 (July 7, 2009).
288. See supra notes 261-63 and accompanying text.
289. Universal Music Austl. Pty. Ltd. v Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (2005) 220
A.L.R. 1 (Fed. Ct. Austl.).
290. The Federal Court of Australia held that KaZaa had "authorized" infringement,
similar to the "inducement" test in Grokster and that it could have taken steps to control or
limit the copyright infringement but chose not to. Id. passim; see also Jane Ginsburg & Sam
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Sweden. 291 In the Netherlands, however, a 2003 Dutch Supreme Court
ruling held that KaZaa was not responsible for the actions of its users
because it found that it was not technically possible for KaZaa to control
infringement, in stark contrast with Grokster.292 Promusicae, RIAA's
Spanish counterpart, brought a case against Pablo Soto, the creator of
several filesharing software programs, alleging that he made the software
available for infringing use.293
4. International Legislation
Many argue that legislatures, rather than courts, should make this delicate
decision as to whether there is a making-available right. 294 Thomas-Rasset
argues that "if there is a problem with the Copyright Act, Congress must fix
it."'295 Sony said that courts generally have deferred to Congress to address
copyright issues arising from new technology. 296
Canada, for one, has recently tabled a bill297 to amend its Copyright Act
which explicitly creates a making-available right by tracking the language
of the WIPO treaties and makes clear that filesharing is an infringing use.298
Ricketson, Inducers and Authorisers: A Comparison of the US Supreme Court's Grokster
Decision and the Australian Federal Court's KaZaa Ruling, 11 MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 1
(2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=-888928. Australia's Full Federal Court similarly decided a
case dealing with "mp3s4free.net." See Cooper v Universal Music Austl. Pty. Ltd. (2006)
156 F.C.R. 380, 389 (Fed. Ct. Austl.) ("[A] person's power to prevent the doing of an act
comprised in a copyright includes the person's power not to facilitate the doing of that act
by, for example, making available to the public a technical capacity calculated to lead to the
doing of that act. The evidence leads to the inexorable inference that it was the deliberate
choice of Mr Cooper to establish and maintain his website in a form which did not give him
the power immediately to prevent, or immediately to restrict, internet users from using links
on his website to access remote websites for the purpose of copying sound recordings in
which copyright subsisted.").
291. See Glenn Peoples, Web Reaction: The Pirate Bay Verdict, BILLBOARD.BIZ, Apr. 17,2009,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/contentdisplay/industry/e3if46ca983d59bcb8fafafdf6defa697d4.
292. Eiseressen/Kazaa B.V., Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the
Netherlands], 19 december 2003, LJN AN7253, AM 2004 1, p. 9 (Neth.), available at
http://zoeken.rechtspraak.nl/resultpage.aspx?snelzoeken--true&searchtype=ljn&jn=AN7253
&u-ljn=AN7253, translated at http://web.archive.org/web/20070710033653/http://
www.solv.nl/rechtspraakdocs/KaZaA+v.+Buma+Stemra+-
+Supreme+Court+19+December+2003.pdf, see also Associated Press, Dutch Court Throws
out Kazaa Case, WIRED, Dec. 19, 2003, http://www.wired.com/entertaimnent/music/news/
2003/12/61672.
293. See Posting of Jon Healey to Bit Player, http://opinion.latimes.com/
bitplayer/2008/06/so- 1999-music-c.html (June 5, 2008).
294. See, e.g., DRAEKE WESEMAN, FuTuRE SHOCK AND THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976: Is
MERELY MAKING A COPYRIGHTED WORK AVAILABLE FOR DIGITAL TRANSMISSION A
VIOLATION OF § 106(3)?, at 25 (2008), available at http://www.wired.com/images-blogs/
threatlevel/files/future shock makingavailable.pdf ("Congress needs to revisit the
Copyright Act of 1976-to address the digital distribution capabilities of the Internet.").
295. See Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 69, at 2.
296. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984) (explaining
that courts have shown "consistent deference to Congress when major technological
innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials").
297. Bill C-61, 2008, 2d Sess., 39th ParI. (Can.), available at
http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Bills/392/Government/C-61/C-61_l/C-61_1.PDF.
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In Europe, most proposed legislation looks to ISPs to enforce copyright
controls. France has enacted a "three strikes" law to mandate that ISPs
withdraw Internet services for third-time offending copyright infringers.
2 99
The first version of the proposed law passed the French Senate, but was
ruled unconstitutional since the adjudicating administrative body would
have presumed guilt.300 A second version of the law that leaves final
adjudication to the judiciary 30 1 has been enacted. 30 2
The European Union has rejected imposing "three strikes" laws across
Europe, saying that it would deny basic civil rights of citizens. 30 3 Germany
rejected "three strikes" laws due to anticipated clashes with privacy laws, 30 4
and Spain has stated that it will also not consider "three strikes" or other
punitive laws against filesharers. 30 5 Similarly, in Denmark, ISPs rejected a
"three strikes" system proposed by the record companies.
30 6
In Britain, the government forced ISPs and content owners to the
negotiating table with the threat that if they did not resolve it themselves,
the government would impose a solution.30 7 The BPI, the RIAA's British
counterpart, 308  coordinated the signing of a "memorandum of
understanding" with six of the leading ISPs to send warning letters to users
298. Id. § 7(l.1)(d); see also id § 9(1.1)(a) ("[T]o communicate it to the public by
telecommunication in a way that allows a member of the public to access it from a place and
at a time individually chosen by that member of the public.").
299. See Aymeric Pichevin, French Assembly Adopts Anti-piracy Bill, BILLBOARD.BIZ,
Sept. 15, 2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/
e3ibe685b1031a7a6fcc69386c2b5bc7ef9; see also Trois Strikes and You're Out,
ECONOMIST, Apr. 18, 2009, at 72; Charles Bremner, Download Pirates Face Being Banned
from the Internet Under Sarkozy Law, TIMES (London), June 19, 2008, at 39,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech and web/article4165519.ece.
300. Jacqui Cheng, French "3 Strikes" Law Returns, Now with Judicial Oversight!, ARS
TECHNICA, July 10, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/its-baack-french-
3-strikes-law-gets-another-go-from-senate.ars.
301. Id.
302. See Pichevin, supra note 299 and accompanying text.
303. French Pirates Face Net Cut-Off, BBC NEWS, Nov. 3, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7706014.stm. The European Union was scheduled to
consider a report that suggested such a "graduated response" plan, however. Posting of
Ernesto to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/eu-plots-pirate-bay-ban-and-piracy-
clampdown-090201/ (Feb. 1, 2009).
304. Trois Strikes and You're Out, supra note 299; Jacqui Cheng, Germany Says "Nein"
to Three-Strikes Infringement Plan, ARS TECHNICA, Feb. 6, 2009,
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/germany-walks-away-from-three-strikes-
intemet-policy.ars.
305. Howell Llewellyn, 'Three-Strikes' off Anti-piracy Agenda in Spain, BILLBOARD.BIZ,
June 22, 2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/
e3i807 le0d9c25cb6b876d377 Ifb7e3dl02.
306. See Posting of Enigmax to TorrentFreak, http://torrentfreak.com/danish-isps-reject-
anti-piracy-proposals-080917 (Sept. 17, 2008).
307. See Andrew Orlowski, Legal, British P2P 'By End of Year,' REG., June 26, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/26/musicserviceprovider talks/.
308. See BPI, http://vww.bpi.co.uk/category/about-us.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2009)
("The BPI [formerly known as British Phonographic Industry] is the representative voice of
the UK recorded music business.").
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that the BPI has identified as infringing.30 9 A BPI representative said that
"all ISPs now recognise their responsibility to help deal with illegal
filesharing." 310 In October 2008, the British ISPs were to begin sending
warning letters to users when given evidence that the users had made files
available. 31' Despite earlier hints from David Lammy, the United
Kingdom's intellectual property minister, that three strikes was not "the
right road to go down," 312 "three strikes" legislation has recently been
proposed by the U.K. government. 313
The Isle of Man has proposed something entirely different. A "blanket
license" has been proposed where Internet users pay a nominal fee (roughly
$1.38 monthly) as part of their Internet access charges and the money is
paid to copyright owners by a special collections agency. 314 Users would
then be permitted to perform unlimited downloads of music 315 and
presumably would also be able to make music available without copyright
liability.
The Irish Recorded Music Association (IRMA), the RIAA's Irish
counterpart, has initiated lawsuits against major Irish ISPs in an effort to
establish a de facto "three strikes" policy without legislation. 316 Earlier in
2009, Ireland's largest ISP agreed to carry out a "three strikes" policy.3 17
309. Robert Ashton, BPI Strikes Deal with ISPs To Reduce Filesharing, MUSICWEEK,
July 24, 2008, http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?sectioncode=l&storycode=1034936.
310. Id.
311. Robert Ashton, ISPs Start Sending Warning Letters, MUSICWEEK, Oct. 2, 2008,
http://www.musicweek.com/story.asp?sectioncode=l&storycode=1035706 (quoting
language from earlier warning letters that said the following: "We're writing to you about
downloading and sharing of copyrighted files on the internet. That's because we've received
a report that copyrighted music has been shared using a computer linked to your Virgin
Media Internet account." (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Chris Williams, BT
Starts Threatening Music Downloaders with Internet Cut-Off, REG., June 26, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/06/26/bt bpiletter/print.html (quoting a warning letter
from BPI forwarded to an individual by a British ISP that said the following: "The sound
recordings in that directory have then been made available to other members of the public
via your internet connection. This is an infringement of the copyright in those sound
recordings.").
312. Richard Wray, Internet Pirates Beware: This Man Is Out To Stop You, OBSERVER
(London), Apr. 26, 2009, Business at 9, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/
2009/apr/26/david-lammy-illegal-downloads-piracy.
313. Associated Press, U.K. Mulls Cutting Pirates' Web Access, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26,
2009, at B5; Nate Anderson, UK Caves to Big Content, Backs 'Net Cutoffs for P2P Use, ARS
TECHNICA, Aug. 25, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/08/uk-caves-to-big-
content-supports-net-cutoffs-for-p2p-use.ars.
314. Eric Pfanner, A Fix for Music Piracy: Tack a Fee on Broadband, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
26, 2009, at B4.
315. Id.
316. Andre Paine, Major Labels Sue Irish ISPs, BILLBOARD.BIZ, June 23, 2009,
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/e3i4bd3d37ca0da05dc9l c93065eba
16a94.
317. Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog, ISP Agrees To Ban Copyright
Scofflaws, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/01/isp-agrees-to-b/ (Jan. 29, 2009, 11:56
EST).
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In 2006, much like Lessig, 318 Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt
said that "we should not hunt a generation." 319 Despite this, Sweden passed
a law that allows copyright owners to request suspected file-sharer IP
addresses from ISPs and pursue individuals directly with a court order. 320
A Spanish European Court of Justice decision permits member states to
pass legislation requiring ISPs to disclose identifying user information. 321
But as one observer stated, the decision requires that legislation must
respect the European Community general principle of proportionality. 322
In the South Pacific, New Zealand, after an initial "three strikes"
legislation proposal met heavy resistance, is considering a new version of
such legislation. 323 The "three strikes" consist of (1) notice from the ISP to
the alleged infringer following a complaint to the ISP from the content
owner, (2) cease-and-desist letter from the ISP, and (3) official infringement
notice from the content owner by obtaining the alleged infringer's contact
information from a Copyright Tribunal. 324 Australia is considering a "three
strikes" law, but is hoping for an industry-led solution following
consultation. 325 The government has also proposed that ISPs act as a filter
and block access to "illegal" sites as determined by the government, but it
appears that ISPs are not cooperating. 326
In Asia, South Korea has passed a "three strikes" law. 327 This law gives
the government discretion to shut down infringing websites for up to six
318. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
319. Jan Libbenga, Sweden Judges Back Pirate Hunter Act, REG., Nov. 14, 2008,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/14/swedencloser to antipiracylaw/. Similarly,
Norway's Minister of Education has voiced opposition to tactics fighting filesharing. Jacqui
Cheng, Norway Education Minister: There's No Future in Fighting P2P, ARs TECHNICA,
Feb. 24, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/02/norway-education-minister-
theres-no-future-in-fighting-p2p.ars.
320. Libbenga, supra note 319; Sweden Passes Anti-P2P, Anti-fileshare Law, P2PNET,
Feb. 26, 2009, http://www.p2pnet.net/story/18636.
321. See Case C-275/06, Productores de Mfisica de Espafia (Promusicae) v. Telef6nica de
Espafia SAU, 2008 E.C.R. 1-00271, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62006J0275 :EN:NOT.
322. EU: ECJ Renders Judgment in Promusicae Case, EUR. PRIVACY & E-CoM. ALERT
(Hunton & Williams, Brussels, Belg.), Apr. 2008, at 1, available at
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s 10News/FileUpload44/15171/EUCommerceAlert_April
_2008.pdf (stating that the law "must strike a fair balance between the fundamental rights
that they protect, and must respect general principles of Community law, such as the
principle of proportionality").
323. John Ferguson, New Zealand Govt Revives Anti-piracy Law, BILLBOARD.BIZ, July
14, 2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/
e3ia62deb261008854a5bl cb008385467b6.
324. Id.
325. Ben Grubb, Conroy Vows To Tackle Illegal File Sharing, ITNEWS, July 15, 2009,
http://www.itnews.com.au/News/l 50133,conroy-vows-to-tackle-illegal-file-sharing.aspx.
326. Asher Moses, Labor Plan To Censor Internet in Shreds, AGE, Dec. 9, 2008,
http://www.theage.com.au/news/home/technology/labor-plan-to-censor-intemet-in-
shreds/2008/12/09/1228584820006.html.
327. Kim Tong-Hyung, Upload a Song, Lose Your Internet Connection, KOREA TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2009, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/tech/2009/04/133_42594.html.
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months and to deny user Internet access. 328 Taiwan has also passed a "three
strikes" law where ISPs are only permitted to pass on the identity of alleged
infringers if the individual user makes a request to restore previously
removed content. 329
On a global scale, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) is
currently being considered to modify international intellectual property
laws.330 "Three strikes" and ISP content filtering does not appear to be
proposed, but filesharing by individual users without profit may still be
subject to criminal sanctions where the sharing is on a "commercial
scale." 331
5. ISPs: Copyright Cops
Recently it has been reported that the RIAA will not initiate any new
lawsuits against individuals. 332 Instead, apparently with the help of the
Attorney General of New York, the RIAA has struck a modified "three
strikes" deal with ISPs in the United States, similar to the "three strikes"
law in France. 333 Crucially, the RIAA will notify ISPs to warn users when
they have made files available.334 This then still maintains the making-
available claim and could be challenged in court.33 5 At least one ISP
refused to cooperate with the plan, saying that it is "not a cop and [it]
doesn't work for free," and has asked for a billing address whenever it has
received a warning from the RIAA. 3 3 6 Verizon, a major ISP in the United
328. Id.
329. Thibault Worth, Taiwan Passes Three-Strikes Piracy Law, BILLBOARD.BIZ, Apr. 27,
2009, http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/content-display/industry/
e3ib20649ac4d6059c2acd520f678899fad.
330. Nate Anderson, ACTA Draft Leaks: Nonprofit P2P Faces Criminal Penalties, ARS
TECHNICA, Feb. 4, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/O2/actual-acta-draft-
leaks-noncommercial-p2p-could-get-criminal-penalties.ars.
331. Id.
332. See McBride & Smith, supra note 54.
333. Id. ("Depending on the agreement, the ISP will either forward the note to customers,
or alert customers that they appear to be uploading music illegally, and ask them to stop. If
the customers continue the file-sharing, they will get one or two more emails, perhaps
accompanied by slower service from the provider. Finally, the ISP may cut off their access
altogether."). Ray Beckerman, a prominent attorney for individual defendants against the
RIAA, asked "what was the legal basis for the NYS Attorney General involvement in this
coordinated agreement among 4 competitors, and 2 separate industries?" Recording Industry
vs The People, http://recordingindustryvspeople.blogspot.com/
2009 01 01 archive.html#929883912691581798 (Jan. 1, 2009, 09:53 EST).
334. See Greg Sandoval, Copy of RIAA 's New Enforcement Notice to ISPs, CNET NEWS,
Dec. 19, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10127050-93.html ("We believe a user on
your network is offering an infringing sound recording for download through a peer to peer
application.").
335. See Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/12/analysis-riaa-s.html (Dec. 22, 2008, 14:19 EST).
336. Greg Sandoval, One ISP Says RIAA Must Pay for Piracy Protection, CNET NEWS,
Dec. 22, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10127841-93.html.
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States, 337 has not yet agreed to participate in the "graduated response plan"
and an agreement is "still being hashed out. '3 38 AT&T, another major
ISP, 339 has stated that it will not cut off a customer's Internet access without
a court order.340 Comcast, also a major ISP, 34 1 has stated that it does not
plan to participate in a "three strikes" policy. 342 One observer wrote that
this is a work-in-progress and the RIAA's goal of "ISP unanimity" is
unachievable. 343
III. THE FREE JAMMIE MOVEMENT
Suing every teenager cannot be the answer. It is hard to believe that the
RIAA honestly thinks that users read and adhere to their iTunes software
license agreement 344 when over half of the music on an average teenager's
iPod has been illegally obtained.345 The RIAA has apparently abandoned
its mass litigation strategy for enforcement through ISPs.346 But it has not
abandoned its legal claim: making-available is the basis for asking ISPs to
take action against individuals. 347
Part III.A argues that a making-available right is not necessary for
copyright owners to enforce their rights against infringers. Part III.B then
argues that the statutory text of the Act and case law do not support the
RIAA's argument that there is a making-available right. Finally, Part III.C
argues that international treaties and legislation are also unconvincing in the
argument for a making-available right.
337. See Alex Goldman, Top 23 U.S. ISPs by Subscriber: Q3 2008, ISP-PLANET, Dec. 2,
2008, http://www.isp-planet.com/research/rankings/usa.html.
338. Nate Anderson, R!AA Graduated Response Plan: Q&A with Cary Sherman, ARS
TECHNICA, Dec. 21, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20081221-riaa-graduated-
response-plan-qa-with-cary-sherman.html; see also Any There There? RIAA Agreements
Remain Flimsy, Unconfirmed . . . , DIGITAL Music NEWS, Jan. 4, 2009,
http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/stories/122208riaa/view (explaining that "one of the
largest ISPs, Verizon, told Digital Music News that a sweeping, stepped-up agreement with
the RIAA simply does not exist," but that "AOL, Comcast, and Charter Communications
representatives indicated that accounts will be terminated if copyrighted materials are shared
over their networks"); Posting of David Kravets to Wired Threat Level Blog,
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2009/01/draft-verizon-o.html (Jan. 5, 2009, 11:43 EST)
(investigating whether any ISPs had agreed to the plan, but unable to find any ISPs that
would admit having agreed to the plan).
339. See Goldman, supra note 337.
340. Greg Sandoval, AT&T Exec: ISP Will Never Terminate Service on RIAA 's Word,
CNET NEWS, Mar. 25, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/830 1-1023_3-10204514-93.html.
341. See Goldman, supra note 337.
342. ComcastBonnie, This Is Our Official Statement about the R1AA StuffT, TWITPIC, Mar.
26, 2009, http://twitpic.com/2gq3y.
343. See Any There There? RIAA Agreements Remain Flimsy, Unconfirmed... ,supra
note 338 ("[T]his is part of an admitted work-in-progress by the RIAA, and any hope of ISP
unanimity is probably too elusive to be true.").
344. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; supra Part IL.D.5.
347. See supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text.
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A. Making-Available Is Not Necessary
The RIAA's most persuasive equitable appeal for a making-available
right is that actual distribution over filesharing networks is impossible to
prove. 348 It is not clear that this is true. 34 9 Regardless, the RIAA does not
need a making-available right in order to defend against infringement.
Thomas was not alone in finding that distribution to the RIAA's
investigator was evidence of actual distribution.350 Also, Thomas pointed
out that the RIAA has other options available: the uploader violates the
reproduction right when making a copy to share and is vicariously liable, as
in Grokster, where inducing others to copy. 351 The RIAA may also pursue
downloaders for violating the reproduction right. 352 Importantly, it appears
as though a lower court consensus is emerging that making-available may
be considered as circumstantial evidence to establish an infringement
claim. 353 This appears to be a middle-ground solution that accommodates
the RIAA's equitable evidentiary concern that was raised in Hotaling, yet
still adheres to statutory law.
B. The Statutory Text and Case Law Do Not Support Making-Available
Because copyright is a statutory law, the making-available debate has
properly centered on the Act.3 54 There is no making-available right
explicitly in the Act,35 5 so if one is to be found, it must be found implicitly.
First, it is not credible to argue that distribution and publication are
synonymous 356 because of similar sentence construction.357 It is difficult to
imagine that Congress intended the identical result, but did not choose
identical statutory wording. In addition, Harper & Row was about the right
of first publication rather than defining distribution or publication. 358
Second, Tasini made clear that a digital file is a "copy or phonorecord" as
required for an infringement claim under the Act.359  Although not
technically a "transfer of ownership" since a copy has not changed hands
for rental, lease or lending, courts seem to have taken a common-sense
position that digital transmission is a transfer of ownership as required for
an infringement claim under the Act. 360 Third, the RIAA's strongest
statutory argument is that there is a separate right "to authorize"
348. See supra Part I.B.1.
349. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 71, 121-23 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
352. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
353. See supra Part I.D.2.
354. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
356. See supra Part II.A. 1.
357. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
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distribution.36 1 Despite the ordinary meaning of "to do and to authorize" in
the statute,362 lower courts that have directly considered the question have
been nearly unanimous that this statutory language was intended to enable
vicarious liability rather than to create a separate "authorization" right.363
Tasini raises questions, however, since the Supreme Court seemed to
directly hold that authorizing distribution was sufficient to infringe. 364
However, since it was clear in Tasini that infringing reproduction took
place, it is plausible that the Tasini comment dealt only with vicarious
rather than direct liability for distribution. 365 Lower courts will likely
adhere to previous precedents until the Supreme Court rules directly on the
issue.
There is little precedential support for a making-available right.
Although it might be hyperbole to claim that "the great weight of authority"
finds against a making-available right,366 it is certainly a fiction for the
RIAA to claim that there are "decades of case law" on point.367 The
original and primary case law precedent for making-available is Hotaling,
from the Fourth Circuit.3 68 Hotaling has been heavily criticized as being
essentially a policy decision to avoid an inequitable result, in contradiction
to statutory language without precedential support.369 If the single line
from Napster in the Ninth Circuit ever did support a making-available right,
it was later explicitly overruled in Perfect 10.370 National Car Rental, from
the Eighth Circuit, never ruled directly on the issue of a making-available
right, but did quote a treatise saying that actual dissemination was
required. 37 1 This was convincing enough for Judge Davis in Thomas to
hold that the comment was not dictum and therefore there is no making-
available right.372 Perhaps most importantly, the majority of lower courts
that have considered this issue directly and thoroughly have decided that
there is no making-available right.3 73  Hotaling and single-sentence
analyses 374 are insufficient to claim a substantial support in order to come
to a confident decision. It is arguable that courts found the making-
available right to be so obvious that explanation was not necessary. Still,
Thomas is likely to be persuasive with other district courts. It is one of only
two cases to date that have conducted a full jury trial, 375 with a thorough
361. See supra Part lI.A.2.
362. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
363. See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
364. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
367. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
369. See supra Part II.B. 1.
370. See supra Part II.B.2.
371. See supra Part II.B.3.
372. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
373. See supra Part II.B.4.
374. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
375. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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briefing from both sides specifically on the making-available issue,376
resulting in a comprehensive and well-articulated opinion.377
C. International Treaties and Legislation Do Not Support
Making-Available
The RIAA's international treaty arguments are unconvincing. The RIAA
seemingly conceded that the denial of a making-available right will not
bring the United States into conflict with its international obligations when
in its reply brief it said that this is "beside the point. '378 International
treaties are not self-executing, and § 106(3) does not necessarily abrogate
any rights under the two WIPO treaties. 379 This effectively defuses the
argument. Similarly, the RIAA did not cite any proof that the President,
executive agencies, or Congress affirmatively considered "head-on" 380
whether there was indeed a making-available right. The RIAA quoted only
judgments that there was no conflict between the Act and the WIPO
treaties. 381 The PTO Commissioner said that nothing in the treaties "affects
the issue of liability.' 382 This, if anything, instead supports Thomas-
Rasset's position, arguing that the treaties do not create any new liability for
making-available. 383  A Secretary of State's "unequivocal[]
endorse[ment] ' ' 384 is more of a public relations statement than a legal
interpretation. Finally, the Copyright Office stated that the Act is "adequate
to fulfill ... the substantive treaty obligations," 3 85 and the House Judiciary
Committee judged that the treaties do not require any change in the Act.386
These are both general statements about the treaties and Act as a whole, but
neither directly addresses the making-available right. The strongest
statement on making-available came from Marybeth Peters, the Register of
Copyrights, who said that there is a making-available right.387 However,
this opinion is advisory, and not binding on courts.388 In sum, the WIPO
treaties and the related governmental hearings provide little support for a
making-available right.
As a whole, then, in the United States there is currently no making-
available right, but making-available may be considered as circumstantial
evidence. Internationally, the case most on point was in Hong Kong, where
an individual uploader's "positive acts," such as posting availability on a
376. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 235-36, 242 and accompanying text.
380. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part II.C.2.
382. See supra note 246 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
383. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
388. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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website and maintaining an Internet connection were sufficient to find
infringement. 389 In other words, making-available might not be as passive
as it sounds, and it might be closer to Grokster's vicarious liability
"inducement" trigger for a finding of infringement. 390 If intent to induce
others to infringe is strong enough, making-available together with an intent
to induce may be sufficient to find liability, or at least sufficient to preclude
summary judgment. To date, however, in the United States, the
"inducement" standard has only applied in vicarious liability situations such
as in Grokster, and not for direct liability for infringing distribution. As a
result, it would be unlikely for any court other than the Supreme Court to
apply this standard to a § 106(3) infringement claim.
As many have suggested, a legislative solution may be required. 391 To
date, only Canada has proposed legislation that directly creates a making-
available right. 392 France's "three strikes" approach to recruiting ISPs to
police copyright and withdraw individuals' Internet access 393 seems to have
spread to the United States. 394 Two major issues remain with the ISP
approach, however: (1) the legal claim is still that there is a making-
available right,395 which would likely fail if challenged in court and (2)
ISPs may not agree to cooperate, which has been seen already. 396
CONCLUSION
Jammie Thomas-Rasset feels as though she is part of a group of
individuals who are being bullied by the RIAA and want to fight back-a
"Free Jammie" movement.397 Currently, many individuals believe that
filesharing is illegal, but they do it anyway.398 This might be due in part to
the culture of the Internet, 399 but this still amounts to blatant disregard for
the law. Fundamentally, laws must reflect society's values or some form of
anarchy will ensue-lawmakers cannot render a generation criminal.400
"Tolerated use" is not a solution, nor is it law: it is only an observation of
behavior that is a stop-gap measure and cannot continue indefinitely. 401
Either society's values, or the law, must change. The making-available
debate is one important part of this evolution.
As debate over the legislation continues in the absence of a Supreme
Court opinion on the making-available right, a strong contingent of the
389. See supra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
392. See supra notes 297-98 and accompanying text.
393. See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
394. See supra Part II.D.5.
395. See supra notes 334-35 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 336-43 and accompanying text.
397. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
398. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
399. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
400. See supra note 260 and accompanying text.
401. See supra Part II.D.I.
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lower courts appears to favor the conclusion that there is no making-
available right in the context of filesharing and individual users. These
courts agree, however, that making-available can be considered as
circumstantial evidence of infringement of the § 106(3) distribution right.
